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I. INTRODUCTION
T HE pursuit of polygamous unions by Mormons in nineteenth-cen-
tury Utah posed challenges for the law of the family unique in the
annals of American legal history. The exotic familial relationships gen-
erated by plural marriages created novel and peculiar problems for the
traditional law of intestacy. Mormon leaders, in an effort to avoid these
* Samuel I. Golieb Fellow in Legal History, New York University School of Law. Ph.D. Can-
didate in History, University of Virginia. B.A., 1982, Amherst College; M.A., J.D., 1986, Univer-
sity of Virginia. I would like to thank Michael Ackerman, Chris Duffy, Alfred Emery, Michael
Klarman, Joe Marklcy, and Charles McCurdy for helpful comments on earlier drafts, and Marcia
Trimble of Special Collections at the University of Virginia Law Library for archival assistance.
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problems, urged their polygamous brethren to make wills.' Many
polygamists, however, either neglected to plan their estates or were ac-
tively opposed to doing so.2 Mormon legislators accordingly sought to
craft statutory schemes that would accommodate the peculiar inheri-
tance needs of polygamous families. These statutes ultimately became a
point of contention between the Utah assembly and Congress; between
the Utah assembly and the Utah courts; and, not surprisingly, among
the Mormons themselves.
This dispute between Congress and the Utah legislative assembly
was ancillary to the larger dispute between those two bodies over polyg-
amy in general. The federal government had never looked favorably on
plural marriage. In 1862, Congress made polygamy a felony in the ter-
ritories,3 while the Justice Department initiated vigorous prosecution of
offenders." In 1882, Congress disfranchised and disqualified from pub-
lic office all polygamists and their wives.5 A congressional act of 1887
revoked the Mormon Church's corporate charter, confiscated much of
the Church's property, and disfranchised all Utah women., Addition-
ally, Utah was repeatedly denied statehood status due to the Church's
refusal to repudiate the doctrine of plural marriage.
During Utah's territorial period, the great majority of its judges
were federally appointed. Given the federal government's devotion to
the eradication of polygamy, it is not surprising that many of the
judges appointed to the Utah bench were hostile to plural marriage.
This hostility was occasionally manifested in cases involving the estates
of intestate polygamists.8 Ironically, when Utah finally achieved state-
hood, the plural families of polygamist decedents fared no better under
an elective state judiciary than they had under its territorial
1. K. YOUNG, ISN'T ONE WIFE ENOUGH? 261, 266 (1954).
2. Id. at 261.
3. Act of July 1, 1862, ch. 126, § 1, 12 Stat. 501, 501.
4. E. FIRMAGE & R. MANGRUM, ZION IN THE COURTS: A LEGAL HISTORY OF THE CHURCH OF
JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER-DAY SAINTS. 1830-1900. at 137-56, 167-97 (1988).
5. Act of March 22, 1882, ch. 47, § 8, 22 Stat. 30, 31-32.
6. Act of March 3, 1887, ch. 397, §§ 17, 20, 24 Stat. 635, 638-39.
7. See Linford, The Mormons and the Law: The Polygamy Cases, 9 UTAH L. REv. 308, 328
(1964).
8. See. e.g., In re Estate of Thomas Cope, 7 Utah 63, 24 P. 677 (1890), rev'd sub nom. Cope
v. Cope, 137 U.S. 682 (1891), discussed infra notes 183-222 and accompanying text; Chapman v.
Handley, 7 Utah 49, 24 P. 829 (1890), appeal dismissed, 151 U.S. 443 (1894), discussed Infra
notes 159-82 and accompanying text. Cf. Estate of Orson Pratt, 7 Utah 278, 26 P. 576 (1891)
(territorial court allowed polygamous children to inherit if acknowledged by decedent), discussed




But the Utah courts would never have had occasion to hear these
cases had they not been litigated among the Mormons themselves. By
1890, Mormon society had undergone transformations that had dimin-
ished the viability of the theocratic commonwealth and of polygamy as
an institution. The history of the la* of intestacy in Utah during this
period serves as a small illustration of the demise of a way of life.
II. THE DOCTRINE OF PLURAL MARRIAGE
The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints records the be-
ginning of the doctrine of plural marriage as July 12, 1843.10 On that
date, Joseph Smith is said to have disclosed the revelation of the doc-
trine of plural marriage to William Clayton in dictation."
And again, as pertaining to the law of the priesthood-if any
man espouse a virgin, and desire to espouse another, and the
first give her consent, and if he espouse the second . . . he is
justified; he cannot commit adultery for they are given unto
him... and to no one else. And if he have ten virgins given
unto him by this law, he cannot commit adultery, for they be-
long to him, and are given unto him; therefore he is justified.
22
In August of 1843, the revelation was read by Hyrum Smith to the
Stake Presidency and the High Council at Nauvoo, Illinois.13
Joseph Smith, the founder and prophet of the Mormon Church,
had actually become convinced of the righteousness of plural marriage
as early as 1831;14 the Church had been charged with polygamy as
early as 1835.15 According to at least one Mormon historian, Joseph
Smith taught the doctrine to the Twelve Apostles in the summer of
1841, and urged its practice. Not all were anxious to comply, however,
and Mormon leaders continued to deny the existence of plural marriage
9. E.g., In re Handley's Estate, 15 Utah 212, 49 P. 829 (1897), discsed Infra notes 252-57
and accompanying text.
10. 1 0. WHITNEY. HISTORY OF UTAH 216 (1892); Linford, supra note 7, at 308.
11. 1 0. WHITNEY, supra note 10, at 216.
12. DOCTRINE AND COVENANTS OF THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRS OF LAT"ER-DAY SAINTS
132:61-62 (1876).
13. 1 0. WHITNEY, supra note 10, at 216.
14. 2 B. ROBERTS. A COMPREHENSIVE HISTORY OF THE CHURCH OF JESUS CHRIST OF LATTER-
DAY SAINTS 95-96 (1930); Linford, supra note 7, at 309.




until well after they had settled around the Great Salt Lake.16
In January of 1850, the residents of Utah set up the Provisional
Government of the State of Deseret. Among the ordinances of the Des-
eret General Assembly was Chapter XVII, section 3, which vested in
the Church the power "to solemnize marriage compatible with the rev-
elations of Jesus Christ. 117 On September 9, 1850, Congress passed the
Organic Act of Utah, which established a territorial government for
Utah.1 8 On October 4, 1851, the territorial assembly passed a series of
resolutions, the first of which made all Deseret laws not in conflict with
the Organic Act legal. 19 Because section 6 of the Organic Act dele-
gated legislative power over domestic relations to the territorial assem-
bly,20 the Church presumably retained power "to solemnize marriage
compatible with the revelations of Jesus Christ."
In late August of 1852, the Church convened for a special confer-
ence at Salt Lake City.2 On August 29, Orson Pratt delivered a ser-
mon in which the revelation of plural marriage was disclosed to the
Church membership at large.22
All of the pieces were now in place. Utah had its territorial status,
and its legislature had the power to regulate marriage. The legislature
had vested in the Church the power to solemnize marriage compatible
with the revelations of Christ, and Christ had revealed to Smith the
doctrine of plural marriage. For the time being, if not for the foresee-
able future, polygamy was a legal form of matrimony in Utah.
III. THE ECCLESIASTICAL COURTS
The practice of plural marriage gave rise to families of mammoth
size and byzantine structure. Given the number of potentially compet-
ing interests in a polygamist decedent's estate, one might expect to find
an abundance of estate litigation pitting family members against one
another. It is therefore quite surprising to discover a distinct dearth of
appellate cases involving the intestate estates of polygamists in the
Utah reports. In fact, no such cases reached the territorial supreme
court until 1890,23 forty years after Utah was granted territorial status.
16. 2 B. ROBERTS, supra note 14, at 101-03 & n.2; Linford, supra note 7, at 309 n.4.
17. Act of Feb. 8, 1850, ch. 17, § 3, 1855 Utah Laws 103-04.
18. Act of Sept. 9, 1850, § 1, 1855 Utah Laws I11.
19. Act of Oct. 4, 1851, 1855 Utah Laws 388.
20. Id. § 6, at 114.
21. Linford, supra note 7, at 309.
22. 1 0. WmTNEY, supra note 10, at 216.
23. Chapman v. Handley, 7 Utah 49, 24 P. 673 (1890), appeal dismissed, 151 U.S. 443
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It is tempting to attribute this rather odd phenomenon to a perva-
sive use of wills. Though the drafting of an effective will would of
course have tended to diminish the quantity of intestate litigation, this
explanation encounters at least two difficulties. First, sixty percent of
all contemporary Americans die intestate;24 it seems unlikely that the
nineteenth-century Mormons in the remote Territory of Utah were any
more meticulous in their estate planning. Second, there is a correspond-
ing lack of will-contest litigation among polygamous families for the
same period. A more compelling explanation of this phenomenon may
be found, however, in an examination of the peculiar manner in which
members of the Mormon Church resolved internal disputes.
In keeping with the scriptural injunction, "Dare any of you, hav-
ing a matter against another, go to law before the unjust, and not
before the saints?" 25 leaders of the Mormon Church actively discour-
aged its members from resolving disputes in civil courts. Members were
instead required to settle differences through dispute resolution mecha-
nisms created by the Church. The first duty of two Mormons embroiled
in a dispute was to seek an amicable solution between themselves. If
this effort bore no fruit, the disputants were next directed to request
that local Church officers, called teachers, mediate. If this mediation
failed to resolve the dispute, the disputants were then authorized to
seek redress in the Church system of ecclesiastical courts.20
Joseph Smith formally organized the Mormon system of ecclesias-
tical courts in 1834 at Kirtland, Ohio.2 7 The ecclesiastical system of-
fered three levels of review. At the trial level was the bishop's court,
which consisted of a panel composed of a bishop (the head of the local
congregation) and his two assistants, called "counsellors." The first
level of appellate review was the "stake high council." A "stake," refer-
ring to the image of a tent stake anchoring the home of Zion in Isaiah
33:20, was a collection of congregations, much like a Presbyterian
synod. The stake high council had jurisdiction to review the decisions of
all bishop's courts within its stake. The ultimate arbiter in the ecclesi-
astical system was'the First Presidency, which consisted of the Presi-
dent of the Church and his assistants (usually two or more) sitting with
(1894).
24. J. DUKEMINIER & S. JoNzSON. WiLTs, TRUSTS AND ESrATES 76 (1984).
25. 1 Corinthians 6:1.
26. E. FIRMAGE & RL MANGRUM, supra note 4, at 21-22; Note, Resolution of Civil Disputes
by Mormon Ecclesiastical Courts, 1978 UTAH L REv. 573.
27. E. FIRMAGE & L MA GRUM, supra note 4, at 28; Note, supra note 26, at 575-76.
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the Council of the Twelve Apostles. At all stages in the litigation, the
parties were encouraged to submit the dispute to a board of arbitration
selected by the parties in conjunction with the court.2
The ecclesiastical system remained intact as the Mormons mi-
grated from Ohio to Missouri; to Nauvoo, Illinois; to Iowa and Ne-
braska; and finally to the Salt Lake Valley.29 In 1850, when Utah was
granted territorial status, federal courts and territorial civil courts were
established in the Territory. On September 21, 1854, Church President
Brigham Young issued a letter making the use of ecclesiastical rather
than civil courts official Mormon policy. 0 Young's letter berated the
complexity of the common law, claiming it wasted time and money and
supported corrupt judges and unscrupulous lawyers. Young touted the
Church courts as more fair, less bound by outmoded precedents, and
geared toward the promotion of reconciliation rather than
factionalism.3 1
The Church's policy of resort to the ecclesiastical rather than the
civil courts was not merely advisory-it was mandatory. The Church
courts were to have "exclusive jurisdiction" over controversies between
and among Church members.32 Indeed, the penalties for suing a fellow
Mormon in civil court were severe. Typically, the defendant in the civil
action would bring charges in the Church courts against the civil action
plaintiff for "unchristian-like conduct . . . in going before . . . the un-
godly."3 3 At this point, the Church court would order the plaintiff in
the civil action to withdraw his suit and pay the court costs. If he re-
fused, he would be excommunicated. 4
The spiritual costs of excommunication were high;30 the worldly
toll could be great as well. "Loss of membership could lead to loss of
28. E. FIRMAGE & R. MANGRUM, supra note 4, at 29-36; Note, supra note 26, at 573-74.
29. See Note, supra note 26, at 576.
30. Id. at 575.
31. E. FiarMAG & R. MANGRUM, supra note 4, at 13-20, 271-74; Note, supra note 26, at 575.
32. E. FIRMAGE & R. MANGRUM, supra note 4, at 21-22, 263-67.
Solidarity was so important to Young that he called in question the membership of any
Mormon who sued a fellow member in civil court. In an official announcement, John
Taylor, Young's successor, sanctioned Mormons' resort to civil courts only to bring ac-
tions against non-Mormons, or against those Mormons who had refused to obey the judg-
ments of Church tribunals and had as a consequence been excommunicated from the
Church.
Note, supra note 26, at 575.
33. Note, supra note 26, at 591 (quoting Minutes of the Salt Lake Stake High Council, May
8, 1877).
34. E. FIRMAGE & R MANGRUM, supra note 4, at 21-22, 287; Note, supra note 26, at 591.
35. See E. FIRMAGE & P. MANGRUM, supra note 4, at 288.
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business, friendship, and even family ties, for the wayward soul. The
threat of social ostracism must have loomed ominously for anyone who
considered challenging priesthood authority or pervasive religious
norms."38 In the isolation of the desert of nineteenth-century Utah, ex-
communication was not a specter to be flirted with lightly.
Though Utah's local probate courts were dominated by Mormons
until 1887,s7 the prohibition against resort to civil courts applied even
to those courts presided over by Mormon judges. 8 One commentator
suggests three reasons for this policy: First, Mormon judges in civil
courts were bound by the same procedural and substantive law of the
civil courts that Young had criticized in his 1854 letter. Second, all
cases brought in civil court were appealable to the often hostile federal
courts. Third, civil cases, unlike ecclesiastical cases, were matters of
public record, and the consequent exposure of internal dissent injured
the cause of Mormon solidarity.39 Mormon civil judges consequently
encouraged resolution of disputes outside the civil courts, but were nev-
ertheless bound to hear the case should the parties insist.
40
The ecclesiastical system was designed to preempt the civil law.
Assuming that only Mormons contracted plural marriages, and that all
intestate estates of polygamous decedents were settled in the ecclesias-
tical courts, one would expect to find nothing especially peculiar in the
Utah probate code. However, it was foreseeable that a first wife and
her children might seek to disinherit plural wives and their children by
bringing an estate into civil court. In order to protect the faithful from
those for whom excommunication was not sufficient persuasion to re-
frain from resort to the civil courts, the Mormon-dominated territorial
legislature enacted its first probate code in 1852.41
IV. THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK
Given the potentially complex structure of polygamous families,
one would expect any probate code designed to govern polygamist dece-
dents' estates to be rather exotic. Indeed, one might expect to find two
distinct probate codes in the Utah statutes: one for monogamous fami-
lies, the other for polygamous families. Surprisingly, Utah's probate
36. Id. at 23.
37. Id. at 24, 219.
38. Note, supra note 26, at 591.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Act of Mar. 3, 1852, ch. 12, 1855 Utah Laws 149-54.
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codes during its territorial period read, for the most part, like any other
probate code. Consider, for example, the 1852 probate code.42 Section
9 appointed the wife as administrator should the will fail to appoint an
executor;43 section 14 spoke of the deceased leaving a "wife or fam-
ily"; 44 section 21 spoke of the maintenance of "a widow or minor chil-
dren."45 In short, the vast majority of the 1852 code seems to have
been designed to govern the estates of monogamous decedents.
There were, however, two distinct legal problems posed by the po-
lygamous family structure. First, at common law, the children of polyg-
amous marriages were considered illegitimate, and the wives of
polygamists were deemed mere concubines. Consequently, polygamous
families were confronted with the failure of the common law and con-
ventional statutory law to provide intestate rights for many of their
family members. The second problem posed by the polygamous family
structure was that of dower. At common law, dower was a wife's right
to a life estate in one third of all real property of which her husband
had been seised in fee simple or fee tail at any time during the mar-
riage. The Mormon solution to each of these problems has its own his-
tory; accordingly, this Article will deal with them separately here.
A. The Intestacy Statutes
The Utah Territorial Legislature made its first attempts to provide
polygamous wives and children with intestate inheritance rights in sec-
tions 24 and 25 of the 1852 probate code. Section 24 appears at first
glance to be an ordinary homestead exemption statute:
The homestead, occupied by the wife, or any portion of
the family of the deceased at the time of his death, shall in all
cases be held free to the use of the wife and family of the
deceased, and shall not be liable to any claim or claims
against said estate . . .46
The rather muddled language at the end of the section, however, ap-
pears to be designed to govern the distribution of any remaining real or
personal property among the heirs of either' monogamist or polygamist
decedents:
42. Id.
43. Id. § 9, at 150.
44. Id. § 14, at 151.
45. Id. § 21, at 152.
46. Id. § 24, at 153.
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[1]f there be other property remaining after the liabilities of
the estate are liquidated, then it shall, in the absence of other
arrangements by will, descend in equal shares to his children
or their heirs; one share to such heirs through the mother of
such children, if she shall survive him, during her natural life,
or during her widowhood; or if he has had more than one
wife, who either died or survived in lawful wedlock, it shall
be equally divided between the living and the heirs of those
who are dead, such heirs taken by right of representation."'
The confusing language of the statute obscures its intended effect. In
Cain Heirs v. Young,4 a case involving the estate of a monogamist, the
Utah Supreme Court interpreted the statute to require that the residu-
ary estate of the intestate descend in equal shares to the children of the
decedent, the widow taking the same share as would a child, with her
share being evenly divided among the children upon her death or re-
marriage.49 Section 24 was thus certainly understood to be the statute
governing the distribution of monogamist decedents' estates; moreover,
the language of the statute appears to contemplate the possibility that
the decedent might be survived by more than one wife.
The scheme of distribution prescribed by section 24 was unusual
for its time. Indeed, Georgia appears to have been the only other state
with a comparable scheme.8 0 In most other states, the widow received
an enumerated fraction of the estate (usually one third), with the re-
mainder being divided among the decedent's children.51 One can easily
see how the scheme erected by the Utah legislature would have been
more attractive to a group of men concerned with the fate of a polyga-
mist decedent's heirs. If each wife were to be given one third of the
estate, two wives would dramatically curtail and three wives would ex-
tinguish the interests of the decedent's children in his estate. Moreover,
47. Id. § 24, at 153 (emphasis added).
48. 1 Utah 361 (1876).
49. Id. at 370. This interpretation of the statute finds some support in the fact that the legisla-
ture in 1876 erected a similar scheme of distribution for property set aside for the support of a
decedent's family pending the administration of the estate: "When property shall have been set
apart for the use of the family in accordance with the provisions of this act, the same shall pass to
such surviving family in equal shares: Provided, the portion inherited by the widow shall, upon her
death, pass to the heirs of the deceased husband." Act approved Feb. 18, 1876, ch. 111, § 117,
1876 Utah Comp. Laws 304.
50. A. BINGHAM, A TarATisE ON THE LAws OF DEscENT 318 (1870); 2 J. KN"r. Co,v,.tm-rA-
liES ON AssPi.cN LAw 568-70 (O.W. Holmes Jr. 12th ed. 1873).
51. 2 J. KENT, supra note 50, at 568-70.
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were a decedent to leave four or more wives, such a conventional
scheme of intestate distribution would, by its own terms, no longer be
susceptible of administration. By simply apportioning the estate equally
among the surviving wives and children, the Utah legislature sought to
avoid such an arithmetic embarrassment.
Because the Utah Supreme Court never had occasion to interpret
section 24 in the context of a case involving the estate of a polygamist,
we are left with little clarification of the legislature's actual intent and
no indication of how the court might have construed the statute. Stand-
ing alone, however, section 24 provided little security for the intestate
rights of plural wives and their children. First, there was the substan-
tial probability that a court, due to the opacity of the statutory lan-
guage, might simply not construe section 24 as a legislative accommo-
dation to the estates of polygamists. Second, there lurked the possibility
that a hostile gentile judge would declare polygamous marriages void
as against public policy and therefore deny plural wives and their chil-
dren any recovery under section 24. The legislature, however, had a
solution to this problem, found in section 25: "Illegitimate children and
their mothers inherit in like manner from the father, whether acknowl-
edged by him or not, provided it shall be made to appear to the satis-
faction of the court, that he was the father of such children." 2
Obviously, one need not have been a child of polygamy to be con-
sidered an illegitimate child, nor were all mothers of illegitimate chil-
dren necessarily plural wives. Nevertheless, section 25 did manage to
integrate plural wives and their children into the distributional scheme
of section 24, irrespective of whether section 24 was understood by it-
self to apply to the estates of polygamists. Reading sections 24 and 25
synoptically, one simply divided the residuary estate into as many
shares as there were wives and children, and distributed the shares
accordingly.
Section 25, presumably a safety net for those polygamous wives
and children denied relief under section 24, provided only for wives
who bore children. This premium on childbearing reflected the purpose
of plural marriage. According to Mormon doctrine, man has a
preworldly existence as a spirit. Life on earth is a transitional stage
during which man takes possession of a human body. Thus, it is incum-
bent upon the Mormon man to father as many children as he can in
order to provide earthly bodies in which preworldly spirits may begin
52. Act of Mar. 3, 1852, ch. 12, § 25, 1855 Utah Laws 149, 153.
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their sojourn to the afterlife.5 3
Not surprisingly, a statute that allowed illegitimates to inherit
from their intestate fathers whether acknowledged or not was some-
thing of a novelty in 1852. At common law, the bastard wasfilius nul-
lius and could inherit from neither his mother nor his father.4 By
1839, Vermont had enacted a statute that permitted illegitimates to
inherit from their mothers.55 Nine other states had similar laws at the
time: Connecticut, Virginia, Ohio, Indiana, Missouri, Illinois, Tennes-
see, North Carolina, and Georgia.5 6 By 1858, Wisconsin law provided
that:
[e]very illegitimate child shall be considered an heir of
the person who shall, in writing, signed in the presence of a
competent witness, have acknowledged himself to be the fa-
ther of such child, and shall in all cases be considered as heir
of his mother, and shall inherit his or her estate, in whole or in
part, as the case may be, in the same manner as if he had
been born in lawful wedlock.
57
In all other states, illegitimates were subject to the disqualifications of
the common law.58 In no state could the mothers of illegitimates inherit
from the child's intestate father, nor did any state permit illegitimates
to inheit without acknowledgement. Given this background, the 1852
Utah statute cannot reasonably be read merely as progressive legisla-
tion on the status of illegitimacy. Its design is clear: to protect polyga-
mous wives and their children.
In 1862, Congress passed the Morrill Act." Section 1 of the Act
made bigamy a crime in Utah. Section 2 annulled the Deseret law that
had made polygamy legal, as well as the territorial resolution by which
it had been reenacted. Polygamous marriages thereby became illegal
and void. Section 2 went on to disapprove and annul "all other acts and
parts of acts heretofore passed by the said legislative assembly of the
Territory of Utah, which establish, support, maintain, shield, or counte-
53. McGrath, Chief Justice Waite and the "Twin Relic'" Reynolds v. United States, 18
VAND. L. REV. 507, 515 (1965).
54. T. REavE THE LAw OF BARON AND FEMME 403 (3d ed. 1862).
55. 1839 Vt. Rev. Stat., ch. 52, § 4, 291-92.
56. T. REEVE, supra note 54, at 404 n.l.
57. 1858 Wis. Rev. Stat., ch. 92, § 2, 554-55.
58. T. REEVE, THE LAW OF BARON AND FUME 275 n.1 (2d ed. 1846).
59. Act of July 1, 1862, ch. 126, 12 Stat. 501.
1991]
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nance polygamy." 60 Nothing in the Act or its legislative history, how-
ever, suggests that Congress intended to annul either of the 1852 stat-
utes. There are no reported cases challenging section 24 under the
Morrill Act; section 25 was not to be challenged under the Morrill Act
until twenty-eight years later.6 '
The 1876 Compiled Laws of Utah reprinted the 1852 probate code
in full. 2 The 1876 legislature also sought to supplement, and to some
extent supersede, the 1852 code. Like its predecessor, the 1876 code
contained some curious provisions. Compare the following two consecu-
tive sections dealing with the disposition of intestate estates:
Sec. 702. If the decedent at the time of the death, be a resi-
dent of this Territory, and the head of a family, the property,
real and personal, then exempt from execution, shall pass to
the surviving family in equal shares. . .. 63
Sec. 703. If the. decedent leave a husband or wife, and only
one child, or the issue of only one child, the estate, except as
provided above, passes one-third to the surviving husband or
wife for life, the remainder and the other two-thirds to such
child or the issue of such child by right of representation. If
there be more than one child living, or one child and the issue
of one or more deceased children living, the estate goes one-
fourth to the surviving husband or wife for life, and the re-
mainder, with the other three-fourths, to the surviving chil-
dren and the issue of any deceased child by right of represen-
tation. If there be no child of the decedent living at the time
of the death, and there be issue of any deceased child, the
remainder goes to all the lineal descendants of the decedent
"64
Section 702 adopted the share-and-share-alike scheme of section 24 of
the 1852 code, while section 703 adopted the enumerated-fraction
scheme embraced by most other jurisdictions, in which heirs' shares of
the decedent's property depended on their relationship to the decedent.
The two schemes were patently inconsistent. Section 703 applied to es-
tates only "except as provided above," i.e., except as provided in section
60. Id. § 2, at 501.
61. See Chapman v. Handley, 7 Utah 49, 24 P. 673 (1890), appeal dismissed, 151 U.S. 443
(1894); see also infra notes 159-82 and accompanying text.
62. Act approved Mar. 3, 1852, tit. XIV, ch. I, §§ 653-84, 1876 Utah Comp. Laws 264-69.
63. Act approved Feb. 18, 1876, tit. XIV, ch. II, § 702, 1876 Utah Comp. Laws 273.
64. Id. § 703, at 273-74.
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702, which governed the estates of all decedents who were residents of
the Territory and "the head of a family." The term "the head of a
family" was nowhere defined, but it is clear that the legislature envi-
sioned two schemes of intestate distribution: one for ordinary husbands
and wives, and one for "heads of families." Given the state of affairs in
Utah at the time, it is not difficult to figure out who was meant by the
term "the head of a family." The share-and-share-alike scheme of sec-
tion 702, particularly suited to the numerical uncertainties of polyg-
amy, was to apply to the estates of polygamist decedents; the more
conventional enumerated-fraction scheme of section 703 was to apply
to the estates of monogamists.
The 1876 legislature also revised the provision of the 1852 code
governing the intestate rights of illegitimate children.,, Section 714 of
Chapter II provided: "Every illegitimate child is, in all cases, an heir to
its mother. It is also an heir to its father when acknowledged by
him."66 Unlike its 1852 predecessor, the 1876 statute made no explicit
provision for the mothers of illegitimate children. Section 732 of the
1876 supplement repealed as much of the 1852 probate code as was
inconsistent with the provisions of the 1876 supplement. 7 Insofar as
the intestate rights of illegitimate children were concerned, the 1876
statute was generally understood to have repealed section 25 of the
1852 probate code.66 However, the portion of the 1852 statute granting
intestate rights to the mothers of illegitimate children was consistent
with the 1876 code, and it is possible that the legislature intended such
women to continue to inherit under that provision of the 1852 code.
In enacting the 1876 statute, which, unlike its predecessor, re-
quired that an illegitimate child be acknowledged by his father before
he could inherit, the territorial assembly apparently sought to make its
illegitimacy statute look less like a sham established to protect polyga-
mous families and more like the Wisconsin statute. How are we to ex-
plain this retreat from radical fringe to progressive vanguard? Justice
Brown of the United States Supreme Court suggested that the statute
was enacted due to the territorial assembly's concern that the Morrill
Act had annulled the 1852 statute.6 9 His explanation is less than com-
65. Id. § 714, at 275.
66. Id.
67. Id. § 732, at 278.
68. See, e.g., Cope v. Cope, 137 U.S. 682, 687 (1891); Brief for Appellant at 2-3. Cope v.
Cope, 137 U.S. 682 (1891).
69. Cope, 137 U.S. at 687.
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pelling. The Morrill Act had been passed fourteen years earlier, in
1862; the territorial assembly had taken no action in the interim.
Moreover, the 1852 statute was not to be challenged under the Morrill
Act until 1890.70
A more plausible explanation may be gleaned from a perusal of
the Council and House Journals for the year 1876. In his message to
the Territorial Assembly of January 11, 1876, Governor George W.
Emery requested extensive revision of the 1852 probate code. Among
the provisions that Governor Emery viewed as in need of reform was
section 25. Regarding that section, the Governor argued: "Such a pro-
vision is simply a premium offered to fraud and perjury, and a great
injustice to legitimate and recognized children of a deceased. Some
writing or acknowledgement of equal certainty, by the putative father,
should, in all cases, be required. 7 1 Even a casual examination of the
differences between section 25 and section 30 suggests that the legisla-
ture, by enacting the 1876 statute, intended to address Governor Em-
ery's concerns. Perhaps the legislature believed that such an acknowl-
edgement requirement posed no substantial threat to the inheritance
rights of polygamous children.
In 1882, Congress passed the Edmunds Act.72 Though generally
hard on polygamy, Congress was sympathetic to the plight of polyga-
mous children. Section 7 provided:
That the issue of bigamous or polygamous marriages, known
as Mormon marriages, in cases where such marriages have
been solemnized according to the ceremonies of the Mormon
sect, in any Territory of the United States, and such issue
shall have been born before the first day of January, anno
Domini eighteen hundred and eighty-three, are hereby
legitimated.7 3
Passed March 22, 1882, the Edmunds Act generously provided a full
nine-month grace period,74 the average length of human gestation.
Congressional generosity, however, was short-lived. On December
13, 1882, Senator George Franklin Edmunds, a Republican from Ver-
70. See Chapman v. Handley, 7 Utah 49, 24 P. 673 (1890), appeal dismissed, 151 U.S. 443
(1894).
71. Message to the Legislature from Governor George W. Emery, January 11, 1876, in Lols-
LATIVE JOURNALS OF UTAH 32-33 (1876).
72. Act of March 22, 1882, ch. 47, 22 Stat. 30.




mont, Chairman of the Judiciary Committee, and sponsor of the Ed-
munds Act, introduced a bill to amend his original Act." As intro-
duced, the bill made no mention of illegitimate children. The bill died
in the Senate that winter,7 6 but was reintroduced by Edmunds on De-
cember 4, 1883," and was promptly referred to the Judiciary Commit-
tee. The Committee reported back in late January of 1884, 7 adding a
new provision: "That hereafter no illegitimate child be entitled to in-
herit from his or her father, or to receive any distributive share in the
paternal estate."791
Undoubtedly aware of these developments in the Congress, the
Utah legislature was, by the spring of 1884, playing defense. On
March 13, 1884, the Utah assembly revised its illegitimacy statute to
read:
Every illegitimate child is an heir of the person who acknowl-
edges himself to be the father of such child; and in all cases is
an heir of his mother; and inherits his or her estate, in whole
or in part as the case may be, in the same manner as if he had
been born in lawful wedlock. The issue of all marriages null in
law, or dissolved by divorce, are legitimate.80
Though more prolix, the first part of the 1884 statute accomplished the
same effect as the 1876 illegitimacy statute. However, by legitimating
the issue of all void marriages, the assembly sought to exempt polyga-
mous children from the disinheriting provision of the Edmunds bill.
Oddly enough, the assembly added this provision as a safety net to a
statute that they probably knew would be annulled. The assembly must
have assumed that only so much of the statute as was inconsistent with
the Edmunds bill would be annulled, and that the legitimating provi-
sion would stand. No court ever clearly ruled on the effect of the Ed-
munds-Tucker Act"1 (the version of the Edmunds bill ultimately en-
acted in 1887) on the 1884 statute; the only subsequent case dealing
with the 1884 statute held that it did not effectively legitimate polyga-
75. 14 CONG. REc. 240 (1882).
76. The bill was last heard from on February 24, 1883. See 14 COWG. REc. 3221 (1883).
77. 3 0. WHmmaZ, supra note 10, at 551-52.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 552.
80. Act of March 13, 1884, ch. XLIV, tit. II, § 4, 1884 Utah Laws 75; Act of Mar. 13, 1884,
pt. Sixth, ch. II, tit. II, § 2742, 1888 Utah Comp. Laws 124.




The 1884 legislature also made some significant changes in Utah's
general law of intestacy. Most importantly, the 1884 code contained no
provision comparable to section 702 of the 1876 code. Indeed, the prin-
ciple of share-and-share-alike had been completely excised from the
scheme of intestacy; the code now adopted the enumerated-fraction
scheme characteristic of monogamous jurisdictions. 8 The 1884 code
contained no provision repealing the 1876 probate code, and it is possi-
ble that the legislature intended section 702 of the 1876 code to con-
tinue to govern the estates of polygamists, without occupying so promi-
nent a place in the Territory's statutory law. However, it is equally
plausible that the Utah assembly, in its effort to model its probate code
after those of other jurisdictions, was now relying on wills, lifetime
transfers, and informal estate settlements to secure the financial futures
of plural widows.
The Edmunds bill was debated in the Senate in June 1884.84
Though most of the debate focused on other provisions of the bill, Sen-
ator George Graham Vest, a Democrat from Missouri, called into ques-
tion the provision disinheriting illegitimates.85 Senator Vest argued that
the disinheritance of innocent offspring was not only unchristian and
inhumane, but economically unsound: "From what great source are our
poor-houses, our jails, our penitentiaries recruited at will?" he queried.
"What is the character of the population which fills the streets of our
great cities at night? . . . These are the vagabond offspring of illicit
love." 86
Senator Vest noted that California, Maine, Minnesota, Dakota,
Idaho, Nebraska, and Nevada all had statutes permitting illegitimates
to inherit from the father when acknowledged by him.87 Senator
George Frisbie Hoar, a Republican from Massachusetts, retorted that
82. Rohwer v. District Court, 41 Utah 279, 286-87, 125 P. 671, 674 (1912); see Infra notes
267-71 and accompanying text.
83. Act of Mar. 13, 1884, ch. XLIV, tit. II, § 3, 1884 Utah Laws 73-75; Act of Mar. 12,
1884, tit. X, ch. LVI, ch. V, § 5, 1884 Utah Laws 407-08. Indeed, the share-and-share-alike
principle embodied in the 1876 statute pertaining to property set aside for the support of the
family pending the administration of the estate (Act approved Feb. 18, 1876, tit. XIV, ch. 3, §
849, 1876 Utah Comp. Laws 304) had likewise been replaced by a statute distributing such prop-
erty according to an enumerated fraction scheme. Act approved Feb. 12, 1884, ch. LVI, tit. V, §
5, 1884 Utah Laws 407-08.
84. 15 CONG. REc. 5286-93 (1884).
85. Id. at 5291-93.
86. Id. at 5291-92.
87. Id. at 5292.
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the father of an illegitimate child was not disabled from making a
will.88 Senator Vest moved to strike the provision and lost.89 Senator
John Rhoderick McPherson, a Republican from New Jersey, succeeded
in having the provision amended so as not to apply to any child born
before the passage of the Act.90
The bill was passed by the Senate on June 18, 1884,91 but again
died in the House. Senator Edmunds reintroduced his bill on December
8, 1885,92 and the bill was debated again in January of 1886.01 On
January 8, 1886, Senator Joseph E. Brown, Democrat of Georgia, pro-
posed that the provision disinheriting illegitimates be amended so as to
provide a grace period for those children conceived but not yet born,
citing the grace period allowed in the Edmunds Act as precedent.?0 At
this point, Senator Edmunds uttered a series of English words, the col-
lective meaning of which is, to say the least, elusive. When the baflled
Brown pressed Edmunds to explain, the wily Senator again replied in
oratory reminiscent of Edward Lear. Bemused, bothered, and bewil-
dered, the mortally nonplussed Brown quickly took his seat. 9
88. 15 CONG. REc. 5292 (1884). Senator Hoar's remarks suggest that the bill's Republican
sponsors did not intend to deprive polygamists of the capacity to provide for their children through
testamentary means. For the contrary interpretation of the Edmnunds-Tucker Act, see Chapman v.
Handley, 7 Utah 49, 55-56, 24 P. 673, 675 (1890), appeal dismissed, 151 U.S. 443 (1894); K.
YOUNG, supra note 1, at 262-63.
89. 15 CONG. Rc. 5293-94 (1884).
90. Id. at 5294-95.
91. Id. at 5298.
92. 17 CONG. REc. 122 (1885).
93. Id. at 549-67.
94. Id. at 563.
95. Id. at 564. The colloquy reads as follows:
Mr. EDMUNDS: The act of 1882 finished up the whole of that subject; and this act
so far as it is necessary at all after that act (as I doubt if it is, because we merely annul
that Territorial act which I think the legal effect of the act of 1882 accomplished) is
merely to put illegitimate children in that Territory on the same footing that illegitimate
children are everywhere else, I believe, in every country. I do not think the provision in
this act was necessary as affecting the status of any illegitimate child born since 1882, or
born after the passage of this act and within nine months, but the point of this provision
is to annul and get off the statute-book of that Territory that act which stands in opposi-
tion to the law of 1882 that we passed, so that my friend's observation really dots not
apply.
Mr. BROWN: If it was proper to allow the period of gestation in that statute is it
not equally proper in this case?
Mr. EDMUNDS: No, because we wound up that business by an affirmative act then
and there, and it is doing no injustice to the illegitimate children in Utah anymore than
elsewhere, because in 1882 we made an end of the question, and this merely annuls their
old act and makes an end of it.
Mr. BROWN: I will not press my amendment, because of course it will share the
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The bill was passed by the Senate on January 8, 1886.96 Sponsored
by Representative William Randolph Tucker of Virginia, Chairman of
the House Judiciary Committee, a considerably altered version of the
bill was passed by the House on January 12, 1887.17 A conference com-
mittee drafted a compromise that was passed by the House on Febru-
ary 17, 1887.98
On February 18, 1887, the bill was debated for the last time in the
Senate.99 The third and last congressman to speak out against the pro-
vision disinheriting illegitimates was Senator Wilkinson Call, a Demo-
crat of Florida. Citing the scriptural directive, "Let little children come
unto me,"100 the Senator argued:
Sir, in my judgment it is a disgrace to civilization as it is a
reproach to the religion of Christ, a barbarism condemned by
every principle of humanity and justice, a cruelty without ex-
cuse or palliation. . . .[T]his law seeks to visit on their inno-
cent heads disgrace and beggary, want and starvation, because
their parents innocently, as they thought, and with the sanc-
tion of divine providence brought them into the world.101
Senator Call's upbraiding fell on deaf ears. The bill was passed by the
Senate that same day.102 The Act became law on March 3, 1887,103
without the signature of President Cleveland, who had doubts as to the
constitutionality of certain of its provisions.
104
In its final form, section 11 of the Edmunds-Tucker Act provided:
That the laws enacted by the legislative assembly of the Terri-
tory of Utah which provide for or recognize the capacity of
illegitimate children to inherit or to be entitled to any distribu-
tive share in the estate of the father of any such illegitimate
child are hereby disapproved and annulled; and no illegitimate
child shall hereafter be entitled to inherit from his or her fa-
ther or to receive any distributive share in the estate of his or
fate of all the others, but it seems to me there is necessity for it.
96. Id. at 565.
97. 18 CONG. REC. 596 (1887).
98. Id. at 1877-82.
99. Id. at 1896-1904.
100. Matthew 19:14.
101. 18 CONG. REc. 1901 (1887).
102. Id. at 1904.
103. Id. at 2667.
104. 3 0. WmrNEY, supra note 10, at 574.
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her father: Provided, [t]hat this section shall not apply to any
illegitimate child born within twelve months after the passage
of this act, nor to any child made legitimate by [the Edmunds
Act].10 5
In its exasperation with Mormon recalcitrance generally, Congress had
finally clamped down on the inheritance rights of polygamous children.
They were no longer the special objects of federal solicitude.
B. The Right of Dower
The right of dower, though technically not a right of intestate suc-
cession, was nevertheless an integral component of the problem of suc-
cession upon death in nineteenth-century Utah. Accordingly, its history
deserves at least brief mention here.
By virtue of the Organic Act of Utah of 1850, the common law
was in effect in the Territory of Utah from its inception.106 Dower, the
common law right of a widow to a life estate in one third of all real
property in which her husband had held a fee simple or fee tail at any
time during their marriage, was accordingly secured to all Utah wives
by the Organic Act. The women of Utah could be deprived of this right
only by explicit legislative action.07
It is not clear when the Utah Territorial Assembly first recognized
that the common-law right of dower was incompatible with the polyga-
mous family structure. Nevertheless, dower did pose serious problems
in the administration of polygamous decedents' estates. First, recall
that a synoptic reading of the ordinances of the Deseret General As-
sembly and the Organic Act of 1850 leads one to conclude that polyg-
amy was a legal form of marriage in Utah before 1862.206 Accordingly,
each wife of a polygamous decedent would have been vested with a
right of dower. Were a decedent to have left two wives, the present
interest of the decedent's children in the decedent's real property,
whether acquired by will, intestate succession, or lifetime transfer,
would have been sharply curtailed; if the decedent had left three wives,
105. Act of March 3, 1887, ch. 397, § 11, 24 Stat. 635.
106. People v. Green, I Utah 11, 13 (1855 term).
107. Hilton v. Thatcher, 31 Utah 360, 365, 88 P. 20, 21 (1906) (citing 1888 Utah Comp.
Laws, pt. First, § 18); Hilton v. Stewart, 31 Utah 255, 260-61, 87 P. 900, 903 (1906); Norton v.
Tufts, 19 Utah 470, 475, 57 P. 409, 409-10 (1899) (citing Edmunds-Tucker Act of 1887 as pro-
viding only two methods by which dower could be waived or forfeited: waiver by the wife and
divorce).
108. See supra notes 10-22 and accompanying text.
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any such present interest would have been extinguished. Were the de-
cedent to have left more than three wives, dower would, by its own
terms, no longer have been administrable.
It is of course possible that a territorial judge would have adhered
to the common-law view that polygamous marriages were void and,
thus, that polygamous wives had no right of dower. In such a case, the
scenario set forth above would have been avoided. However, precisely
the same result might have been rendered had a less-than-fastidious
frontier judge held polygamous marriages to be void, yet held at the
same time that dower was a right of intestate succession. Recall that
section 25 of the 1852 probate code accorded to the mothers of illegiti-
mate children the intestate rights of the mothers of legitimate children,
i.e., the intestate rights of lawful wives. If a judge were to have con-
strued dower as an intestate right, then section 25 would have vested
plural wives with that right. Such a construction would thus have ren-
dered nearly the same results and the same problems as a construction
recognizing plural marriages as valid.
Finally, because dower was a right that could be exercised to set
aside the terms of a will or a lifetime transfer, it gave first wives sub-
stantial power over the financial futures of plural widows. Suppose, for
example, that John had five wives. His first wife, Mary, was recognized
by the common law as his legal wife. All of his other wives were polyg-
amous, and, at common law, merely concubines. At the time John
made his will, Mary owned outright the property on which she lived.
Accordingly, John devised all of his real property in equal shares to his
other four wives. Mary could, by exercising her right of dower, obtain a
life estate in one third of the real property devised to the other four
wives. Thus, a first wife hostile to the decedent's other wives could frus-
trate the husband's testamentary plan to provide for them by exercising
her right of dower. Against this right the plural wives had no defense.
It has been suggested by at least one commentator that the Utah
legislature intended, by enacting section 24 of the 1852 probate code,
to abolish the right of dower in Utah.109 Recall that section 24 provided
in part: "[O]r if he has had more than one wife, who either died or
survived in lawful wedlock, it shall be equally divided between the liv-
ing and the heirs of those who are dead .... "110 Nothing in the his-
tory of section 24 lends any insight into the intention of its framers. It
109. Linford, supra note 7, at 324 n.79.
110. Act of March 3, 1852, ch. XII, § 24, 1855 Utah Laws 153.
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is true that the statute admits of a construction that permits all wives
of a polygamous decedent to share equally in the decedent's estate:
were a decedent to leave more than three wives, it would be impossible
for any of them to take a life estate in one third of the decedent's
holdings in real property. Under such a construction, therefore, section
24 would by implication have abolished the right of dower under such
circumstances. The statute is far from a model of perspicuity, however,
-and statutes in derogation of the common law (as section 24, under
such a construction, most certainly would have been) were strictly con-
strued by common law judges. While there were no reported cases that
settled this issue, it is fair to assume that no judge of the period trained
in the common law would have construed section 24 as having abol-
ished the right of dower. The ambiguities of section 24 notwithstand-
ing, it appears that the common-law right of dower was in effect in
Utah in 1852.
It was not until 1872 that the territorial assembly offered any fur-
ther clarification of the status of dower in Utah. Section 3 of "An Act
Concerning the Property Rights of Married Persons" provided: "No
right of dower shall exist or be allowed in this Territory.""" Ironically,
this legislation was enacted within six weeks of the territorial gover-
nor's call for enactment of a comprehensive marriage law. In his an-
nual message to the territorial assembly of January 9, 1872, Governor
George L. Woods had urged:
There are many rights incident to, and growing out of, the
marriage relation, which make it absolutely necessary that
there should be a plain, positive statute upon that subject.
Such as the right of the wife to support, and to the protection
of her person, including the protection of her children, her
right to a separate estate, and to her individual earnings; her
right of dower in the estate of her deceased husband-claims
which are in harmony with the spirit of the age, and founded
in equity and good judgment. I cannot urge you too strongly
to speedily enact such a law upon marriage as will meet this
great public want. By so doing you will render to the people of
the Territory an invaluable service, in preventing interminable
and vexatious litigation, which otherwise must inevitably
come.
1 12
111. Act approved Feb. 16, 1872, ch. XVII, § 3, 1872 Utah Laws 27.
112. Message of Governor George L. Woods to the Utah Territorial Assebly, January 9.
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Rather than securing the wife's right of dower by enacting a compre-
hensive marriage law, the territorial assembly responded to Governor
Woods's exhortation by abolishing that right. Curiously, Governor
Woods approved the 1872 statute without amendment the very day it
was presented to him for review.
The popular interpretation of this legislative maneuver was ex-
pressed in an "Address" sent to "Mrs. Rutherford B. Hayes and the
Women of the United States" by the Anti-Polygamy Society of Salt
Lake City on November 7, 1878. The "Address" read in part: "Our
legislature is composed almost entirely of polygamists and members of
the Mormon priesthood. They have thrown around polygamy every pos-
sible legislative safeguard in their power, and the right of dower has
been abolished to break down the distinction between the lawful wife
and the concubine."113
The Anti-Polygamy Society's interpretation of the 1872 legislation
is eminently plausible. Unfortunately, the legislative history provides
little insight. There is no record of any dower dispute between polyga-
mous wives in the Utah reports prior to 1872, nor is there any record in
the Utah reports of the 1872 statute having been challenged. If the
Anti-Polygamy Society was correct, it appears on the scant evidence
available that the measure was precautionary rather than reactionary.
A rather intriguing analysis of the 1872 legislation was offered by
the petition to Congress of Mrs. Angie F. Newman." 4 On June 8,
1886, Mrs. Newman petitioned Congress to repeal the act of the Utah
legislature of February 12, 1870, which granted the elective franchise
to the women of the Territory. In her petition, Mrs. Newman raged:
The same body of men who passed the act of 1870 legislated
away the right of dower-an infamous scheme to give the hus-
band the leverage of power over the first wife. If she refuses to
give the husband a second, he in retaliation may will the prop-
erty to the second, or the tenth, and the first wife be left
penniless.
Oh! Boasted magnanimity of the Mormon hierarchy
touching the civil status of women! "Oh! Liberty, what deeds
are done in thy name! '115
1872, Journal of the Legislature of Utah, 20th Session, 1872, 33-34 (emphasis supplied).
113. H.R. ExEc. Doc. No. 58, 45th Cong., 3d Sess. 2 (1879).
114. WOMEN SUFFRAGE IN UTAi, S. Misc. Doc. No. 122, 49th Cong., 1st Sess. (1886).
115. Id. at 5.
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Though Mrs. Newman's argument contains an internal inconsistency,
it would be unfair to dismiss her point. Certainly, were a wife to refuse
her husband a second wife, the husband would have no second wife to
whom to devise his property. However, with dower abolished, the wife
was placed at the mercy of her husband's testamentary largesse. Were
he to decide to devise all of his property to someone other than his wife,
his wife would have no claim against his estate. While it appears plau-
sible that the 1872 legislature may have been motivated in part by a
desire to give the husband power to coerce his wife into consenting to a
plural marriage, it would be foolish to accord that motivation dispro-
portionate weight. It would be difficult to explain, under such an analy-
sis, why the general goal of keeping wives in line had not set off a
national movement to abolish dower. It must be assumed that the rec-
ognition of the inconsistency of the right of dower with the polygamous
family structure played the pivotal role in the legislature's decision to
enact the 1872 statute.
The 1880s witnessed a campaign to restore the right of dower to
the women of Utah. The leaders of this campaign were Eli H. Murray,
the new governor of the Territory, and the federally appointed Utah
Commission."' In his first annual message to the territorial legislature
in January of 1882, Governor Murray urged the legislature to see the
error of its ways:
Sheer justice then demands the right of dower for wifehood.
Unjust discrimination, unrest and untold suffering follow its
denial. Every enlightened argument favors it. To grant the
elective franchise and deny the right of dower is entirely in-
consistent. It is denied in no state or Territory except where
something better is given. The passage of an act that restores
the right of dower to the wives of Utah will receive my cordial
approval.117
Governor Murray reiterated this request in 1884,1 and again in
1885.1 9 Each time his request was met with legislative silence.
116. The Edmunds Act, which disfranchised all polygamists and their wives, see supra notes
72-74 and accompanying text, created the Utah Commission to supervise elections in the Utah
territory. See E. FIRMAGE & R. MANGRUM, supra note 4, at 231-37.
117. Message of Governor Eli H. Murray to the Utah Territorial Assembly, 1882 Utah Coun-
cil Journal 32.
118. Message to the Legislature from Governor Eli H. Murray, January 14. 1884, 1884 Utah
Council Journal 28-29.
119. Message to the Legislature from Governor Eli H. Murray, January 11, 1886, 1886 Utah
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On September 16, 1883, Governor Murray issued his annual re-
port to Congress. Distraught by political and social conditions in the
Territory, Murray saw the need for sweeping reform. Accordingly,
Murray urged that, if within the next legislative session the Utah legis-
lature did not, among other things, "bestow the right of dower or its
equivalent" upon the wives of Utah, "that Congress shall repeal that
section of the organic act establishing such a body and assume control
in the Government here."' 20 Congressional action, however, was not as
yet forthcoming.
In 1884, Governor Murray's voice was joined by that of the Utah
Commission. In its report to Congress dated April 29, 1884, the Com-
mission included the following: "In addition, we would also recommend
the enactment of a law by Congress giving to the first (or legal) wife
the right of dower as at common law, or other interest in the real estate
of her husband as provided in the statutes of many of the states.11121 It
is apparent from the wording of the Commission's recommendation
that it viewed restoration of dower not as an act for the benefit of Utah
women, but as an attack on polygamy. Apparently the Commission be-
lieved that, were the right of dower restored to the first wife, fewer
Mormon women would be willing to enter plural marriages. While the
restoration of dower might indeed have created some disincentive for
women considering plural marriage, its effect would most likely have
been marginal. The preponderance of current opinion indicates that
Mormon women entered plural marriages more for reasons of the spirit
than for those of the flesh. 122
On June 10, 1886, the House Judiciary Committee reported back
on the Edmunds-Tucker bill.123 Section 22 of the proposed legislation
restored the right of dower in the Territory of Utah. Stated the Com-
mittee's report:
This re-establishes the dower right of the widow secured to
Council Journal 36.
120. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE GOVERNOR OF UTAH, H.R. ExEc. Doc. No. 1, 48th Cong., 1st
Sess. 636 (1883).
121. REPORT OF THE UTAH COMMIssION, APRIL 29, 1884, H.R. ExEc. Doc. No. 153, 48th
Cong., 1st Sess. 6 (1884). This recommendation was to be reiterated by the Commission the
following year. REPORT OF THE UTAH COMMISSION, OCTOBER 28, 1885. H.R. EXEc. Doc. No. 1,
49th Cong., 1st Sess. 889 (1885).
122. For a comprehensive study of the economics and psychology of polygamous marriages,
see K. YOUNG, supra note 1.
123. For a discussion of the Edmunds-Tucker Bill, see supra notes 75-106 and accompanying
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her in England by Magna Charta. Dower, which is inconsis-
tent with plural marriages, was abolished by the Territorial
legislature of Utah, and is now to be restored, as continuing
the claim of the lawful wife upon her living husband, against
his estate, when he dies.12
With the passage of the Edmunds-Tucker Act in 1887, the con-
cerns of Governor Murray and the Utah Commission were finally ad-
dressed by congressional action. Section 18(a) of the Act provided: "A
widow shall be endowed of third part of all the lands whereof her hus-
band was seized [sic] of an estate of inheritance at any time during the
marriage unless she shall have lawfully released her right thereto."'2
Curiously, this provision of the Act appears never to have been de-
bated. The right of dower remained intact for the remainder of Utah's
territorial period.
V. THE DECLINE OF THE ECCLESIASTICAL COURTS
In 1890, cases dealing with polygamist decedents' estates began to
appear in the Utah reports. Not coincidentally, the late 1880s and the
1890s saw the gradual demise of the Mormon system of ecclesiastical
courts. At least two major factors contributed to the death of the eccle-
siastical system: the draconian antipolygamy campaign of the federal
government and the development of the American West.
Historian Leonard J. Arrington has characterized the Mormon
economy of the mid-nineteenth century as "one which was relatively
self-sufficient, relatively equalitarian, and relatively homogenous," a
"tightly-reined independent theocratic commonwealth."'20 As another
commentator has pointed out, however, "with the transcontinental rail-
road came an infusion of capitalism into Utah's cooperative economy,
and a concomitant philosophy of individualism began to erode the eth-
ics of mass cooperation and self-denial which underlay the vast work of
Mormon colonization in the Great Basin.' 27 Firmage and Mangrum
have noted that "[a]s the impetus to establish a separate socioeconomic
community waned toward the end of the nineteenth century, the neces-
sity of maintaining a separate court system eroded.' 28
Mormon esprit de corps also suffered greatly at the hands of the
124. HLR. REP. No. 2735, 49th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 9 (1886).
125. Edmunds-Tucker Act, ch. 397, 24 Stat. 635, 638 (1887).
126. L. ARRINGTON. GREAT BASIN KINGDOM 237, 244 (1958).
127. Note, supra note 26, at 534.
128. E. FIRMAGE & R. MANGRUM, supra note 4, at 262.
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federal government. Through the better part of the nineteenth century,
the Mormons had responded to persecution by closing ranks. Convic-
tions under the Morrill Act had been difficult to obtain: "key witnesses
disappeared, plural wives refused to testify against their husbands, and
sympathetic juries would not convict."u2 After the Morrill Act had
been upheld by the United States Supreme Court in Reynolds v.
United States,1 30 Church President Wilford Woodruff had responded,
"I will not desert my wives and my children and disobey the command-
ments of God for the sake of accommodating the public clamor of a
nation steeped in sin and ripened for the damnation of hell. I would
rather go to prison and to death."""
By the late 1880s, however, Mormon resistance had finally been
worn down. The vigor of the federal government's efforts to prosecute
polygamists had sent many of the Church's leaders fleeing to Canada
or Mexico, or to prison. Without leadership, many of the Saints' exper-
iments in social organization began to crumble.13 2 The Edmunds Act
had disqualified Mormons to sit as jurors at bigamy trials,13 3 and had
disfranchised and disqualified from public office all polygamists and
their wives.13 4 The Edmunds-Tucker Act had made adultery a crime; 81
greatly curtailed the jurisdiction of local probate courts;136 caused all
property held by the Church not for worship or burial purposes to es-
cheat to the United States;137 revoked the Church's corporate char-
ter;13 8 made probate judges Presidential appointees;139 disfranchised all
Utah women;140 required anti-polygamy oaths to be taken by voters,
grand jurors and petit jurors; 41 reestablished dower;142 and disinherited
all polygamous children.14 3 By 1888, Utah's application for statehood
129. McGrath, supra note 53, at 534.
130. 98 U.S. 145, 168 (1878).
131. McGrath, supra note 53, at 534 (quoting K. YOUNG, ISN'T ONE WIFE ENOUGH? 367
(1954)).
132. E. FIRMAGE & R. MANGRUM, supra note 4, at 205.
133. Edmunds Act, ch. 47, § 5, 22 Stat. 31 (1882).
134. Id. § 8, 22 Stat. at 31-32.
135. Edmunds-Tucker Act, ch. 397, § 3, 24 Stat. 635, 635-36 (1887).
136. Id. § 12, 24 Stat. at 637.
137. Id. § 13, 24 Stat. at 637.
138. Id. § 17, 24 Stat. at 638.
139. Id. § 19, 24 Stat. at 639.
140. Id. § 20, 24 Stat. at 639.
141. Id. § 24, 24 Stat. at 639-40.
142. Id. § 18(a), 24 Stat. at 638.
143. Id. § 11, 24 Stat. at 637.
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had been rejected six times.144
This massive federal assault finally caused the Mormons to begin
making concessions. Article XV, section 12 of the 1887 proposed Utah
Constitution contained a prohibition of polygamy. 14 Chapter VII of
the 1892 Utah laws made polygamy a crime.1, 6 Article HI, section 1 of
what ultimately became the Constitution of the State of Utah also pro-
hibited polygamy.147 Perhaps the most telling of these conciliatory ges-
tures was the renunciation of the doctrine of plural marriage by the
Church itself. On September 24, 1890, President Wilford Woodruff is-
sued what has come to be known as the Woodruff Manifesto: "I now
publically declare that my advice to the Latter-day Saints is to refrain
from contracting any marriage forbidden by the law of the land. 14 8
The Manifesto was accepted as authoritative and binding by unani-
mous vote of a General Conference of the Church convened at Salt
Lake City on October 6, 1890.149
These contributions to the diminution of solidarity among the
Mormon community were reflected in the practices of the ecclesiastical
courts during the late 1880s and 1890s. Until the mid-1880s, profes-
sional advocates had been excluded from practice in the Church
courts. 150 By 1886, however, attorneys made regular appearances in the
Salt Lake City bishop's courts.' 5' The members of the high councils
considered these attorneys especially valuable in cases presenting com-
plex issues of fact and law. 52
[T]he recognition of a legitimate role for attorneys in the
Church court system was an admission by the bishops and
high councilors that their decisions should be legally accurate
as well as roughly equitable. Their judgments began to be
viewed as illegitimate if they did not conform to the legally-
defined rights and obligations of the parties. As they tried to
duplicate the results of civil court trials, both the necessity
and legitimacy of the Church courts came into question. As
144. The rejections occurred in 1851, 1856, 1862, 1872, 1882, and 1887. See Linford, supra
note 7, at 328.
145. HK. Misc Doc No. 104, 50th Cong., 1st Sess. 11 (1888).
146. Act of Feb. 4, 1892, ch. 7, § 1, 1892 Utah Laws 5-6.
147. UTAH CONST. art. III, § 1.
148. See 3 0. WHrrN', supra note 10, at 745.
149. Id. at 744-46.





greater emphasis was laid on honoring the legal rights of indi-
viduals, as those rights were defined by civil government, the
reasons for a separate Church court system began to fade. If
the Mormons did not trust the Church courts to define their
rights in accordance with equity and justice, it became less
justifiable to excommunicate a defendant for an honest differ-
ence over the interpretation of secular law.153
Indeed, as the need to allay gentile concerns caused the Church to re-
nounce polygamy and the political direction of its members in the
1890s, "the justification for church courts hearing secular matters wore
thin. Thus by 1900 the exclusive jurisdiction rule was no longer
emphasized."' 54
After 1880, Church courts no longer reviewed the acts of govern-
ment officials.155 This policy was affirmed by a letter from the First
Presidency in 1889.156 After 1893, the St. George High Council no
longer heard civil disputes . 57 By 1903, a Church magazine had de-
clared that "[a]ll disputes involving legal titles must be adjudicated by
courts of competent jurisdiction. The point is this, Church courts must
not undertake to interfere with the legal rights of any member."'' 58
By 1890, Mormon solidarity was breaking down, the ecclesiastical
system was being phased out, and the Church had renounced plural
marriage as a divinely ordained institution. It was time to play family
feud.
VI. THE CASES
A. Chapman v. Handley
The first case on the issue of polygamous intestate succession to
reach the territorial supreme court was Chapman v. Handley.',,
George Handley had died intestate in 1874, leaving two wives and
eight children. By his lawful wife, Elizabeth Handley, he had fathered
four children: John Handley, William Handley, Charles J. Handley,
and Emma N. Handley. By his polygamous wife, Sarah Chapman,
whom he had married according to the rites and tenets of the Church,
153. Id. at 592-93.
154. E. FIRMAGE & R. MANGRUM, supra note 4, at 271.
155. Note, supra note 26, at 593.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 593-94.
158. See Note, supra note 26, at 594 (quoting 38 THE JUVENILE INSTRUCTOR 467 (1903)).
159. 7 Utah 49, 24 P. 673 (1890), appeal dismissed, 151 U.S. 443 (1894).
[Vol. 23:281
INTESTATE SUCCESSION
he had also fathered four children: Mary F. Handley, Ruth A. Newson,
Benjamin T. Handley, and Harry F. Handley. Mary Handley died un-
married and intestate on September 28, 1879. Accordingly, when the
other three children petitioned the probate court to share in George
Handley's estate pursuant to section 25 of the 1852 probate code, Sa-
rah Chapman claimed a share of the deceased's estate as Mary's suc-
cessor in interest. 160 It is interesting to note that Sarah Chapman
framed her claim as that of a successor in interest to an illegitimate
child rather than as the mother of illegitimate children. 01 Recall that
section 25 of the 1852 probate code provided not only for inheritance
by illegitimate children, but also by their mothers. For reasons that will
soon become apparent, this was a clever strategic move. In the end,
however, for rather technical reasons, it failed to yield recovery.
When the probate court denied the petition, the petitioners ap-
pealed to the territorial district court. On May 3, 1890, the case was
heard by the District Court for the Third Judicial District of Utah Ter-
ritory, County of Salt Lake, Judge T.J. Anderson presiding. Judge An-
derson denied the petition, holding that:
The court is of opinion and doth conclude as a matter of law
that said petitioners are not, under the laws of the Territory of
Utah and of the United States, entitled to any part of the es-
tate of the said George Handley, deceased, and their petition
is hereby dismissed with costs.1
6 2
Judge Anderson did not elaborate the rationale for his decision; it is
not clear whether he believed that the Morrill Act had annulled Sec-
tion 25. In any event, the petitioners appealed his decision to the Terri-
torial Supreme Court on May 5, 1890.
The issue before the territorial supreme court was whether the
Morrill Act of 1862 had annulled section 25 of the 1852 probate code.
Section 2 of the Morrill Act had disapproved and annulled all "acts
and parts of acts heretofore passed by the said Legislative Assembly of
the Territory of Utah, which establish, support, maintain, shield, or
countenance polygamy ... 1., The respondents contended that the
1852 statute was such a law and had therefore been annulled by the
160. Id. at 51, 24 P. at 674.
161. Id.
162. Record at 4, Chapman v. Handley, 151 US. 443 (1894) (No. 206).
163. Act of July 1, 1862, ch. 126, § 2, 12 Stat. 501; see supra notes 59-61 and accompanying




Justice Henry Parry Henderson, writing an opinion for the court
in which Justice Charles Shuster Zane concurred, deemed the thresh-
old issue to be the purpose of the 1852 statute. The Justice found that
the statute was designed to "support, shield, maintain and counte-
nance" polygamy.16 5 He reasoned that the statute had been passed at a
time when Utah had been inhabited almost exclusively by believers in
plural marriage, and that the offspring of such marriages were illegiti-
mate at common law.166 Given this state of affairs at the time of the
statute's passage, Justice Henderson concluded, the purpose of the stat-
ute was undoubtedly to protect plural wives and their children.167 The
Justice further argued that the 1852 illegitimacy statute would neither
deter men from entering into plural marriage nor turn legal wives
against plural marriage, for the strength of religious conviction would
overcome these mundane pecuniary concerns.' 6 8 Oddly enough, Justice
Henderson did not consider plural wives to be blessed with the same
degree of religious conviction: he saw the statute as being a direct re-
sponse to their concern for their own and their children's financial
security.'
69
The appellants contended that disinheriting the children of polyga-
mous marriages was an unjust infliction of punishment upon an inno-
cent class of persons.'70 Justice Henderson responded that Congress
had been legislating against polygamy as an institution when it passed
the Morrill Act, and that, while disinheriting illegitimates might be in-
equitable, it was nevertheless a potent factor in discouraging sexual ir-
regularities.'17 Just as the common law recognized that the status of
illegitimacy was instrumental in deterring fornication, so Congress, in
enacting the Edmunds-Tucker Act, had recognized disinheritance of
polygamous children as a weapon in the war against polygamy.
The final portion of Justice Henderson's opinion is somewhat hard
to understand, largely because he confuses the provisions of the Ed-
munds Act and the Edmunds-Tucker Act. It appears that the appel-
lants had argued that, had Congress intended in the Morrill Act to
164. Handley, 7 Utah at 51, 24 P. at 674.
165. Id. at 55, 24 P. at 675.
166. Id. at 54, 24 P. at 675.




171. Id. at 55-56, 24 P. at 675.
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annul the 1852 statute, the portion of the Edmunds-Tucker Act disin-
heriting illegitimates would have been unnecessary. By enacting section
11 of the Edmunds-Tucker Act, appellants contended, Congress had
implicitly recognized that illegitimates had, up to that point, been in-
heriting from their fathers.7 2 Justice Henderson responded that the
Edmunds-Tucker Act was necessary because the Edmunds Act had le-
gitimated all children previously born of polygamous marriages.
17 3
Moreover, Justice Henderson continued, if illegitimates had been inher-
iting from their fathers according to the 1852 statute, then the section
of the Edmunds Act legitimizing them would have been unnecessary.'
7
4
The court thus concluded that the Morrill Act had annulled the 1852
statute, and affirmed the decision of the district court.
75
Justice Henderson's opinion is flawed for a number of reasons,
some of which are considered in Justice John Widener Blackburn's dis-
sent, which will be discussed presently. However, at least two points not
appearing in Justice Blackburn's dissent are worthy of mention.
First, Henderson's argument that the Edmunds-Tucker Act was
necessary because the Edmunds Act legitimated previously born polyg-
amous children defies logic. Though the Edmunds Act legitimized all
children born before January 1, 1883, it did nothing to resuscitate the
1852 law nor to provide any inheritance rights for those born thereaf-
ter. If the Morrill Act had annulled the 1852 statute, then section 11 of
the Edmunds-Tucker Act was indeed superfluous.
Second, Justice Henderson's reading of the legislative history of
sanctions against polygamous children leaves something to be desired.
There is no mention of the inheritance rights of polygamous children in
the Morrill Act itself, nor was the subject discussed in the Act's legisla-
tive history. Indeed, there is no indication that Congress was even
aware of the 1852 statute until January of 1884. Congress's first legis-
lation with respect to polygamous children was, if anything, magnani-
mous: the Edmunds Act legitimized them. It was not until public
clamor against polygamy had reached fever pitch and the draconian
provisions of the Edmunds-Tucker Act had been proposed that Con-
gress had manifested any intent to use children's rights as a bargaining
chip.
Justice Blackburn's dissent offers more convincing reasoning. First,
172. Id. at 56, 24 P. at 675.
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. Id. at 57, 24 P. at 675.
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he argued, there was nothing in the Morrill Act regarding the rights of
illegitimate children.1" 6 The 1852 statute had been before Congress
when the Morrill Act was passed, and if Congress had intended to in-
validate the statute it would have said so. Courts disfavor repealing
laws by implication, the Justice noted, and the 1852 statute, on which
title to a great deal of property was based, ought not to be repealed
without weighty reasons.
1 77
Justice Blackburn argued further that the 1852 statute did not es-
tablish, support, maintain, shield, or countenance polygamy, because
allowing illegitimate children to inherit was not inconsistent with the
severest punishment and overthrow of polygamy.1 8 Blackburn also
noted the lenience of the Edmunds Act with respect to illegitimate chil-
dren and the twelve-month grace period provided by the Edmunds-
Tucker Act.179 Thus, he concluded, Congress did not manifest any in-
tent to repeal the 1852 statute in the Morrill Act.
1 80
Justice Blackburn conceded that the part of the 1852 statute that
permitted the mother of illegitimate children to inherit as a lawful wife
might indeed establish, support, maintain, shield, or countenance polyg-
amy, in which case that portion of the statute might have been invali-
dated by the 1862 Morrill law.181 He was quick to point out, however,
that this issue was not before the court.1 82 Thus it can be seen that
Sarah Chapman's decision to claim as the heir of her daughter Mary
rather than as the mother of illegitimate children was the correct stra-
tegic move. If she had claimed as a mother she would have run the risk
not only of being denied her own claim, but of bringing a potentially
invalid feature of the statute before the court and thereby threatening
her children's recovery.
B. Cope v. Cope
Justice Blackburn was to be vindicated by the United States Su-
preme Court in Cope v. Cope.1 83 The Cope case had been a companion
case to Handley under the name In re Estate of Thomas Cope.184 In a
176. Id. at 58, 24 P. at 676 (Blackburn, J., dissenting).
177. Id.
178. Id. at 60, 24 P. at 676.
179. Id. at 60-61, 24 P. at 676-77.
180. Id. at 61, 24 P. at 677.
181. Id. at 62, 24 P. at 677.
182. Id.
183. 137 U.S. 682 (1891).
184. 7 Utah 63, 24 P. 677 (1890).
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one-paragraph opinion, Justice Henderson had announced for the court
that Cope was decided in accord with Handley.185 Justice Blackburn
had dissented without opinion.
Cope had first been heard in the Probate Court for Salt Lake
County by Judge John A. Marshall. The facts as stipulated were as
follows: Thomas Cope died intestate August 22, 1864, leaving an estate
valued at $15,000. Cope left one son, Thomas H. Cope, by his lawful
wife Janet Cope, and one son, George H. Cope, by his plural wife Mar-
garet Cope. In the distribution of the estate, George H. Cope was ex-
cluded from the inheritance, and the whole estate decreed to Janet
Cope and Thomas H. Cope. Margaret Cope was not a party to the
action.186
On March 1, 1889, Judge Marshall rendered the decision of the
court, which held "that George H. Cope aforesaid is the son... of the
polygamous marriage of said Thomas Cope; that he is not an heir of
said deceased, Thomas Cope, nor entitled to any share in the distribu-
tion of his estate.
18 7
Judgment was entered accordingly. On April 25, 1889, George
Cope appealed to the District Court for the Third Judicial District of
Utah Territory, County of Salt Lake, where the case was heard by
Judge T.J. Anderson. On January 22, 1890, Judge Anderson affirmed
the holding of the Probate Court, holding:
And as conclusions of law the court finds-
1. That the sole heirs at law of said Thomas Cope, de-
ceased, are Janet Cope and Thomas H. Cope and are alone
entitled to share in the distribution of the estate of said
Thomas Cope. ...
2. That the said George H. Cope is not an heir of said
Thomas Cope, deceased, and is not entitled to any share of
said Thomas Cope's estate. 88
Appeal was taken to the Utah Supreme Court on February 11, 1890.
The affirming opinion of that court was handed down on January 19,
1891.
George Cope was represented in his appeal before the United
States Supreme Court by J.G. Sutherland of the Salt Lake City firm of
185. Id. at 63, 24 P. at 677.
186. Record at 1, 7-8, Cope v. Cope, 137 US. 682 (1891) (No. 1327).
187. Id. at 8.
188. Id. at 11.
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Sutherland & Judd. In writing his brief, Mr. Sutherland took his cues
largely from Justice Blackburn's Handley dissent. Appellant argued
that the annulling clause in the Morrill Act was a repeal by implica-
tion, and therefore did not repeal any legislation "except to the extent
of unavoidable repugnancy."18 Because a law permitting illegitimate
children to inherit from their intestate fathers could be carried into
effect without impugning a law severely punishing polygamists, the
Morrill Act did not operate to annul the 1852 statute. Appellant fur-
ther argued that, because the 1852 law also offered relief to illegitimate
children not born of polygamous unions, there was no ground for the
assertion that the 1862 antipolygamy law was designed to invalidate
the 1852 statute.190
Appellant next argued that constructions of statutes that would
produce odious results were to be avoided if the plain meaning of the
statute so permitted.191 The respondents' construction of the Morrill
Act, appellant argued, shocked the conscience:
In England, while her criminal law was at the acme of its
brutality, a statute made one an accessory who gave meat and
drink to a felon, but his wife and children were excepted out
of it by construction. Now, in this humane and enlightened
age, it is sought to involve children in the offense of the father
by cutting off their meat and drink.'92
Eloquent and emotive opprobrium ensued:
If the annulling clause repeals that statute, polygamous chil-
dren are thereby degraded to the state of bastards at common
law, to be without father or mother, brothers, sisters or collat-
eral kindred-waifs-unrelated beings, thrust out upon life's
great common by resentful fate to expiate sins which they
never committed, while those who are bastards have heritable
rights. A statute which works such injustice, by relegating
those who are in no social sense bastards, to the obsolete sta-
tus which the common law assigned to the children of sin,
should express its malign purpose plainly . . . .Such a law
would resuscitate a legal condition, purely artificial, that the
sad lot of those in it may serve a retributive purpose in regard
189. Brief for Appellant at 5, Cope v. Cope, 137 U.S. 682 (1891) (No. 1327).
190. Id. at 8-9.
191. Id. at 9-10.
192. Id. at 10.
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to others. It would reduce innocent persons to a status which
the moral sense of mankind has long since abolished, because
it involves gross injustice .... 193
Counsel for the appellant further argued that the 1852 statute
countenanced polygamy no more than any other statute that recognized
polygamous children as entitled to equal protection of the law:
A law allowing them to inherit countenances polygamy
no more than the law which authorizes a will devising prop-
erty to them or a law which holds another bound by his con-
tract with them; or a law which permits them to share the
benefits of schools supported by public funds.94
Thus, counsel argued, if the Morrill Act had annulled the 1852 statute,
it had simultaneously annulled every other law that did not specifically
exclude polygamous children from its protection. 9 5 To suppose that
Congress intended by the Morrill Act a wholesale nullification of terri-
torial law, counsel argued, would be "a disrespect to Congress."198
Appellant finally argued that, because the Edmunds Act and the
Edmunds-Tucker Act expressly amended the Morrill Act, the three
laws were in pari materia and should therefore be read together as one
harmonious piece of legislation.1 17 The 1852 statute was before Con-
gress when it passed the Morrill Act, and Congress had neither re-
ferred to it nor expressly annulled it. In 1876, the Utah legislature had
reenacted the 1852 statute in modified form. If Congress had intended
the Morrill Act to annul the 1852 statute, it would have seen the 1876
statute as an act of impudence and annulled that statute "with the em-
phasis of a righteous indignation."198 Instead, Congress had not only
recognized the capacity of polygamous children to inherit, it had con-
ferred the full status of legitimacy on them. If Congress had intended
by the Morrill Act to disinherit all polygamous children, was it not odd
that the generally harsher Edmunds Act, passed at a time when public
outcry against polygamy was greater, had fully legitimized them?
Moreover, counsel noted, the Edmunds-Tucker Act, which had ex-
pressly annulled all Utah statutes recognizing the capacity of illegiti-
193. Id. at 10-11.
194. Id. at 14.
195. Id.
196. Id.
197. Id. at 15-16.
198. Id. at 21.
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mates to inherit, had specifically excluded from its coverage all illegiti-
mate children born within twelve months of its passage, as well as all
children made legitimate by the Edmunds Act.""9
The annulling of the laws of the territory here mentioned
evinces no dissatisfaction with their operation in the past, nor
any denial that they have operated in the past. The language
of this section implies that those territorial laws have oper-
ated, and will operate, except as that section otherwise
provides.2 °°
Counsel concluded, therefore, that the Morrill Act had not annulled
the 1852 statute, and the decision of the territorial supreme court mer-
ited reversal.20 1
Counsel for the respondent, Mr. R.N. Baskin, argued that "no sys-
tem of civilized jurisprudence ever permitted"20 2 an adulterine bastard
to enjoy full inheritance rights, because "to permit it would be a hei-
nous wrong, subversive of society and all good morals. ' 20 3 Because the
1852 statute was in derogation of the common law, a court should con-
strue it narrowly, granting inheritance rights to illegitimates and their
mothers only where there were no legitimate heirs. Because the dece-
dent here had left legitimate heirs, Baskin contended, George Cope
could claim no share in his father's estate.204
Counsel next examined the intent underlying the 1852 statute.
Given the social conditions in Utah at the time of its passage, he ar-
gued, the plain purpose of the statute was to raise concubines and bas-
tards to the same level as wives and legitimate children.20 5 The statute
encouraged and protected "the evil practices of adultery by offering a
reward to the woman who sacrifices her virtue to the calls of alleged
religion. 206 Counsel rhetorically inquired whether such a law was not
void ab initio on principles of public policy, "as opposed to all decency
and morality. 207
Baskin next argued that even if the 1852 statute had been valid
199. Id. at 19.
200. Id.
201. Id. at 21.
202. Brief for Respondents at 3, Cope v. Cope, 137 U.S. 682 (1891) (No. 1327).
203. Id. at 5.
204. Id. at 2-3.
205. Id. at 6-7.
206. Id. at 7.
207. Id. at 6.
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when enacted, it had been annulled by the Morrill Act.20 8 The Morrill
Act had annulled all Utah laws that supported, maintained, shielded,
or countenanced polygamy. The 1852 statute had been enacted for ex-
actly that purpose and with precisely that effect. Responding to the
appellant's contention that the Morrill Act could not have repealed the
1852 statute by implication, Baskin argued that the difference between
a repeal and an annulment made the doctrine of repeal by implication
inapposite. A repeal, Baskin contended, is an act by the same body
which passed a law; an annulment is an act by a superior body, which
cannot be presumed to have had all of the inferior body's legislation
before it. The remainder of respondents' brief consisted in large part of
a moral denunciation of polygamy, teeming with vintage nineteenth
century overstatement.
The Cope case was submitted to the United States Supreme Court
on December 22, 1890. On December 29, 1890, Justice Samuel F.
Miller died. President Harrison quickly appointed Henry Billings
Brown, United States District Judge for Eastern Michigan, to fill the
vacancy. Confirmed without opposition in the Senate, Brown took his
seat on January 5, 1891.2 °9 On January 19, 1891, the newly appointed
Brown read the opinion of the Court determining the fate of George
Cope and, potentially, of a generation of polygamous offspring.
In reversing the decision of the territorial supreme court, Justice
Brown began by observing that the 1852 statute was in derogation of
the common law and a novelty among inheritance statutes.2 10 Never-
theless, he ruled, there was no reason to declare it invalid.2 11 The Or-
ganic Act had delegated authority to promulgate legislation regarding
succession to the territorial assembly. Picking up on appellant's some-
what disingenuous argument that the 1852 statute, "in its essential fea-
tures, follows the lead of legislation which is general in this country,
differing only in details," 21 2 Justice Brown noted that many jurisdic-
tions had statutes permitting illegitimates to inherit not only from their
mothers, but from their fathers as well where the parents had subse-
quently married, or where there were no lawful children, or where the
illegitimate child had been duly adopted or provided for by will: "And
208. Id. at 7.
209. 2 L. F DumAN & F. IsRAE, Ti Jusrncas OF THE UNiT.D STATES Supraar.E COURT
1789-1969, at 1555 (1969).
210. Cope v. Cope, 137 U.S. 682, 684 (1891).
211. Id.
212. Brief for Appellant at 10, Cope (No. 1327).
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if the question of parentage be satisfactorily settled, there would seem
to be power in the legislature to endow even the children of an adulter-
ous intercourse with inheritable blood from the father."
213
While he recognized that it was the duty of the Court to construe
statutes to be consistent with good morals, here Justice Brown could
find no legal principle that "would authorize us to pronounce a statute
of this kind, which is plain and unambiguous on its face, void, by rea-
son of its failure to conform to our own standard of social and moral
obligations. 214
Justice Brown conceded that the state of affairs then obtaining in
Utah rendered the 1852 statute "much wider in its operation" than
illegitimacy statutes in other states and territories.213 The children,
however, were not responsible for that state of affairs, and to punish
them for their parents' sins, he contended, would have been unjust:
To recognize the validity of the act is in the nature of a pun-
ishment upon the father, whose estate is thus diverted from its
natural channel, rather than upon the child; while to hold it to




The Court also rejected the claim that the Morrill Act had an-
nulled the 1852 statute.1 The 1852 statute, the Court held, did not
establish, maintain, support, shield, or countenance polygamy. 218 It did
not treat polygamous offspring as legitimate; rather, it put all illegiti-
mate children, "whether the fruits of polygamous or of ordinary adul-
terous or illicit intercourse, upon an equality and vest[ed] them with
inheritable blood. ' 219 Legislation favorable to polygamous children did
not necessarily shield or countenance polygamy. There was no inconsis-
tency in protecting polygamous children while punishing polygamists.
The Court rejected respondent's contention that courts should be more
receptive to claims of annulment by implication than to claims of re-
peal by implication.220 In order for the-territorial statute to have been
annulled by the Morrill Act, the former must have had a clear and
213. Cope, 137 U.S. at 684-85.
214. Id. at 685.
215. Id.
216. Id.






direct tendency to establish and support polygamy. That, the Court
held, was not the case here.
Justice Brown rounded out the opinion by reiterating the in pari
materia analysis offered by the appellant in his brief.221 Noting specifi-
cally the wholesale legitimation of polygamous children by the Ed-
munds Act and the twelve-month grace period afforded by the Ed-
munds-Tucker Act, the Court concluded:
The object of these enactments is entirely clear. Not only does
Congress refrain from adding to the odium which popular
opinion visits upon this innocent but unfortunate class of chil-
dren, but it makes them the special object of its solicitude, and
at the same time offers to the parents an inducement, in the
nature of a locus penitentiae, to discontinue their unlawful
cohabitation.222
Accordingly, the decision of the territorial supreme court was reversed.
There was no reported dissent.
C. Estate of Orson Pratt and the Subsequent Proceedings of Handley
Meanwhile, back in Utah, the territorial district court had heard
Estate of Orson Pratt.223 Orson Pratt had died intestate in 1881, leav-
ing some legitimate children, many polygamous children, and a whop-
ping estate. 24 The polygamous children's petition to share in the estate
(no plural wife had joined in the petition) had been denied by the dis-
trict court. On appeal, the territorial supreme court reversed, citing the
United States Supreme Court's opinion in Cope. 25 In a per curiam
opinion, the Utah court entered a decree "that all of the children ac-
knowledged by [Pratt] as such in his life-time, or proved to be such by
satisfactory evidence, shall share in the distribution of the estate."22 0
The wording of the decree comports with the liberality of the 1852
statute. Because the Pratt estate's descent was cast in 1881, after the
more conservative 1876 statute was enacted, it may be presumed that
the territorial court did not read the 1876 statute as repealing the 1852
statute.
221. Brief for Appellant at 15-19, Cope (No. 1327).
222. Cope, 137 U.S. at 689.
223. 7 Utah 278, 26 P. 576 (1891).
224. Id. at 278-79, 26 P. at 576.
225. Id.
226. Id. at 279, 26 P. at 577.
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In 1894, the Handley clan aired its dirty linen before the United
States Supreme Court.227 On appeal, the respondents presented three
main arguments. First, respondents contended that the claims of the
appellant distributees were several and not joint. Because each individ-
ual share of the $25,000 estate divided among eight heirs was less than
the $5,000 federal jurisdictional requirement, the Court did not have
jurisdiction to hear the case.2
Second, respondents argued that the Handley case was distin-
guishable from Cope. Whereas the Cope marriage had taken place
prior to the passage of the Morrill Act, the Handley marriage had
taken place in 1866, in flagrant violation of the 1862 congressional leg-
islation. In addition, where the Cope case had involved only innocent
polygamous offspring, here the polygamous wife of the deceased and
mother of these illegitimates was a party to the action, seeking to reap
the fruits of her own criminality. A ruling for the appellants would
therefore, unlike the Cope decision, shock the conscience and flout the
will of Congress.
Finally, the respondents urged somewhat circumspectly that Cope
be overturned.229 For this section of the argument the respondents re-
submitted the brief used before the Utah Supreme Court. Counsel ar-
gued first that the sole motivation of the legislature in enacting section
25 was to support and shield plural marriage.23 0 Given the existence of
polygamy and Mormon domination of the territorial assembly at the
time of the legislation's passage, counsel argued, the purpose of the
statute was beyond doubt.23 l
Counsel next argued that section 25 did in fact support, maintain,
protect, shield, and countenance polygamy, and thus had been annulled
by the Morrill Act.232 In so arguing, counsel placed particular emphasis
on that portion of the statute that permitted the mothers of illegiti-
mates to inherit. As discussed previously, because Sarah Chapman was
claiming not as a mother of illegitimate children but as an intestate
distributee of the estate of her deceased daughter Mary, that portion of
the statute was not technically before the Court .2 33 Not surprisingly,
227. Chapman v. Handley, 151 U.S. 443 (1894); see supra notes 159-82 and accompanying
text for a discussion of the earlier proceedings of this case.
228. Brief for Appellant at 2-4, Chapman v. Handley, 151 U.S. 443 (1894).
229. Id. at 6-8.
230. Id. at 7.
231. Id. at 7-8.
232. Id. at 8.
233. See supra notes 181-82 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 23:281
INTESTATE SUCCESSION
counsel for the respondent sought to obscure this distinction and make
the most of Sarah Chapman's joinder in the cause.
The legislation which we are now discussing was one of
the most seductive arguments in favor of polygamy. If allowed
to stand, the polygamous wife is not punished for her crime, or
her part in the crime of her husband, but she is rewarded by
being allowed to inherit the estate of her husband. Her chil-
dren were not made illegitimate, but they were to stand upon
the same plane, and viewed in the same favorable light as the
legitimate children. Could any reasoning be brought to bear
upon the mind of the doubtful female more ingenious, or more
inclined to induce her to submit to the polygamous relation
... .As an act of humanity, other legislatures may have
sometimes enabled illegitimate children to inherit; but no-
where before can any statute be found which authorizes the
co-partner in a crime, the illicit mistress to be rewarded for
her crime, by being permitted to inherit equally with the law-
ful wife.2
Counsel finally argued that section 7 of the Edmunds Act, which
had legitimated all polygamous children born before January 1, 1883,
was an express congressional declaration that, until that date, polyga-
mous children had had no inheritance rights. 235 Thus, counsel surmised,
the 1882 Congress must have thought that the Morrill Act had an-
nulled section 25.236
The appellants were again represented by Mr. J.G. Sutherland of
Sutherland & Judd. Mr. Sutherland's brief was mercifully concise. As
authority for the proposition that the appellants were entitled to share
in the decedent's estate, he cited section 25 of the 1852 code.237 As
authority for the proposition that the Morrill Act had not annulled sec-
tion 25, counsel cited the ruling of the United States Supreme Court in
Cope v. Cope.238 Finally, counsel argued that the claims of the appel-
lants were joint rather than several, thereby conferring jurisdiction on
the Court. 39
Chief Justice Melville W. Fuller delivered the unanimous opinion
234. Brief for Respondents at 11, Handley (No. 206).
235. Id. at 12.
236. Id. at 13.
237. Brief for Appellants at 2, Chapman v. Handley, 151 U.S. 443 (1894) (No. 206).
238. Id.
239. Id. at 2.
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of the Court. In a brief, three-page opinion, the Chief Justice ruled
that the claims of the appellants were several and not joint.2 0 Because
no one of the individual appellants' several claims satisfied the jurisdic-
tional prerequisite of $5,000, the Court dismissed the appeal for want
of jurisdiction.241 Consequently, the Court had occasion neither to re-
consider Cope nor to distinguish it from Handley on other than juris-
dictional grounds.
In 1894, Congress passed legislation enabling Utah to enter the
Union as a state on the condition that the Utah Constitution contain a
provision prohibiting polygamy.242 This condition was met by Article
III of the Utah Constitution, and, in 1896, Utah became a state.243
That same year, the Utah state legislature drafted its first probate
code. 44 Section 1 of "An Act defining and providing for the right of
Dower" reenacted section 18(a) of the Edwards-Tucker Act verba-
tim.245 The common-law right of dower was abolished by section 2832
of the 1898 Utah laws.246 In its place the Utah legislature enacted sec-
tion 2826, which gave the wife, subject to some qualifications not im-
portant here, a fee simple in one third of all legal or equitable estates in
real property possessed by the husband at any time during coverture 47
Section 2826 remained in effect until 1977, when the Utah legislature
adopted the Uniform Probate Code. 48
The 1896 legislature also enacted three new provisions that
seemed to secure the heretofore precarious inheritance rights of polyga-
mous children. The 1896 code legitimated all children born of polyga-
mous marriages before January 4, 1896.249 It gave inheritable blood to
240. Handley, 151 U.S. at 446.
241. Id. at 446.
242. Act of July 16, 1894, ch. 138, § 3, 28 Stat. 107, 108.
243. Article III of the Utah State Constitution begins:
The following ordinance shall be irrevocable without the consent of the United
States and the people of this State: . . . No inhabitants of this state shall ever be mo-
lested in person or property on account of his or her mode of religious worship; but polyg-
amous or plural marriages are forever prohibited.
UTAH CONST. art. III. (1895).
244. UTAH REv. STAT. tit. 72 (1897).
245. Id.
246. Id. § 2832.
247. Id. § 2826.
248. UTAH CODE ANN. tit. 75, (1978).
249. Section 1 of "An Act to Legitimate the Issue of Bigamous and Polygamous Marriages,
born on or prior to January 4th, 1896, and declaring their Heritable and other rights" (Section
2850) provided:
That the issue of bigamous and polygamous marriages, heretofore contracted between the
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all polygamous children whose fathers had died between the enact-
ments of the 1884 illegitimacy law and the Edmunds-Tucker Act, as
well as to all polygamous children born during Utah's statehood .2a
Moreover, it granted new trials to all polygamous children who had
been denied their inheritance rights in estates wherein the descent had
been cast before the enactment of the Edmunds-Tucker Act.2 15
members of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints, born on or prior to the 4th
day of January, A.D. 1896, are hereby legitimated; and such issue are entitled to inherit
from both parents, and to have and enjoy all rights and privileges to the same extent and
in the same manner as though born in lawful wedlock.
Act effective January 4, 1896, ch. LXXXII, § 1, 1896 Utah Laws 527 (codified at 1907 Utah
Comp. Laws § 2850).
250. Section I of "An Act relative to the Heritable Rights of the Issue of Polygamous Mar-
riages" (Section 2848) provided:
That section 2742 of the Compiled Laws of the Territory of Utah [the 1884 illegitimacy
statute] included when first enacted and effectually operated at all times thereafter and
now operates to include the issue of bigamous and polygamous marriages, and entitles all
such issue to inherit, as in said section provided, except such as are not included in the
proviso of section 11 of the act of Congress called the "Edmunds-Tucker Act"...
Act relative to the Heritable Rights of the Issue of Polygamous Marriages, ch. XLI, § 1, 1896
Utah Laws 317 (codified at 1907 Utah Comp. Laws § 2848).
251. Section 2 of "An Act relative to the Heritable Rights of the Issue of Polygamous Mar-
riages (Section 2849) provided:
That in all cases involving the rights of such issue to so inherit, heretofore determined
adversely to such issue in any of the courts of the Territory of Utah, a motion for a new
trial or rehearing shall be entertained, on application of such issue who was or were
parties, at any time before the 10th day of March, 1897, and the case or cases in which
said motion is so directed to be heard shall be deemed transferred to the court of the
state of Utah corresponding to that of the territory of Utah in which such adverse deci-
sion was made, and the courts shall thereupon proceed to hear and determine such mo-
tion, and if granted, to proceed to hear and determine the case or cases without prejudice
from the lapse of time since the former hearing or any prior determination of a like
motion; provided, that this section shall not be construed to affect the rights of bona fide
purchasers from any such parties before the approval of this title.
Act relative to the Heritable Rights of Polygamous Marriages, ch. XLI, § 2 1896 Utah Laws 318
(codified at 1907 Utah Comp. Laws § 2849).
On approving sections 2848 and 2849 on March 9, 1896, Governor Heber M. Wells sent the
following message to the legislature:
I understand that the purpose of this act is to reenact and make clear the laws already in
operation, and that it entitles the issue of polygamous marriages born previous to March
3rd, 1888, to inherit or be entitled to any distributive share in the estate of the father of
such issue. I believe that this legislation is proper and right and it appears to me, in view
of the fact that conditions which called forth Congressional legislation on this subject are
settled, and that the past has been condoned, that it would be in the interest of public
policy and for the welfare of the state to remove whatever ban may exist against the issue
of polygamous marriages, up to one year succeeding the date of the amnesty proclama-
tion of the President; or what would be better in my judgment, up to the date of the
admission of the State. I am convinced that such legislation would not only be in the
interest of the State, but the children themselves affected thereby, would be better citi-
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In 1897, the Handleys performed their swan song before the Utah
Supreme Court.252 The Handleys sought a rehearing and a decree in
their favor under the new provisions of the 1896 code.253 Writing for
the court, Chief Justice Charles Shuster Zane denied the petition for
rehearing and invalidated sections 2848 and 2849. Justice Zane first
noted that the Handley case had been decided under the 1852 statute,
not the 1884 statute (section 2833 of Compiled Laws of Utah 1907).21"
Even conceding that the rights of the parties should have been decided
under the 1884 law, however, it was beyond the power of the legisla-
ture to enact section 2848. The decree sought to be set aside, noted
Justice Zane, had become final six years before the enactment of sec-
tion 2848.255
After the court has interpreted or construed a statute on the
trial of a case, and rendered judgment, the legislature cannot
affect it by a declaratory or explanatory law, giving the law
under which the decree.was rendered a different construction.
To hold that the legislature can, would recognize the law-
making department as a court of errors . . . Such a concen-
tration of power would give to the class of officers possessing it
absolute power and that would amount to despotism.
256
Under the territorial law in effect when the decree was entered, the
Handleys had had ten days after the verdict to move for a new trial,
and twenty days after the verdict to move for a rehearing. After that
time elapsed, those rights were lost, the decree became final, and the
rights had vested in Handley's legitimate children. Sections 2848 and
2849, Justice Zane held, were an attempt to usurp judicial authority,
an unconstitutional violation of the principle of separation of powers
zens in the knowledge that they were entitled to all the legal rights and privileges of their
fellows. Legislators will not forget that while the manifesto was final with the great ma-
jority of the people, it signaled the immediate surrender of what had for a lifetime, been
held as a vital religious sacrament, and some hearts cannot change in a day.
Message to the Utah Senate from Governor Heber M. Wells, March 9, 1896, 1896 Utah Senato
Journal 356-57.
252. In re Handley's Estate, 15 Utah 212, 49 P. 829 (1897).
253. Specifically, the Handleys sought review under sections 1 and 2 of chapter 41 of the 1896
laws of Utah (sections 2848 and 2849 of the 1907 Compiled Laws of Utah). Handley, 15 Utah at
217-18, 49 P. at 829-30.
254. Id. at 216-17, 49 P. at 830.
255. Id. at 220, 49 P. at 831.
256. Id. at 217, 49 P. at 830.
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embodied in Article 5 of the Utah Constitution. 0 Thus, the Chief Jus-
tice penned the final chapter in the sordid Handley saga.
D. Later Cases
In 1905, the Utah Supreme Court heard Raleigh v. Wells.2  The
plaintiff, a plural wife, sought to quiet title to her deceased husband's
homestead, where she had lived for forty-six years.210 The decedent had
died testate, and in his will had left the plaintiff an equitable share of
his estate. The property in question had been devised to the Mormon
Church with a life estate reserved for his daughter by another wife:
Mrs. Caroline Wells, the defendant. The plaintiff sought to renounce
her rights under the will and to appeal to the chancellor to award her
the home.260
The opinion of the court was written by Chief Justice George
Washington Bartch; Justices William Murdock McCarty and Daniel
Newton Straup concurred. The court held, without appeal to statutory
authority, that, by becoming a plural wife, the plaintiff had placed her-
self beyond both the aid of the law of inheritance and the conscience of
the chancellor.261 In the alternative, the plaintiff sought to exercise her
right of dower. The court ruled, again without appeal to statutory au-
thority, that, as a plural wife, the plaintiff had no right of dower to
12exercise.
The Utah Supreme Court decided In re Garr's Estate"3 in 1906.
John Garr, a bachelor, had died intestate in 1900, leaving as his only
lineal descendants the children of his deceased illegitimate son.2 " The
district court had ordered the estate distributed to Garr's collateral kin-
dred, excluding his grandchildren. The supreme court opinion was
again authored by Chief Justice Bartch, with Justices McCarty and
Straup concurring. The court held the evidence sufficient to entitle
Garr's illegitimate child to inherit Garr's estate under section 2833, as
well as under section 10 of the 1898 Revised Statutes."' The latter
statute provided:
257. Id. at 218-19, 49 P. at 830-31.
258. 29 Utah 217, 81 P. 908 (1905).
259. Id. at 219, 81 P. at 909.
260. Id. at 219-20, 81 P. at 909.
261. Id. at 221, 81 P. at 910.
262. Id.
263. 31 Utah 57, 86 P. 757 (1906).
264. Id. at 59-60, 86 P. at 757-58.
265. Id. at 69-70, 86 P. at 761.
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The father of an illegitimate child by publicly acknowledging
it as his own, receiving it as such with the consent of his wife,
if he is married, into his family, and otherwise treating it as if
it were a legitimate child, thereby adopts it as such, and such
child is thereupon deemed for all purposes legitimate from the
time of its birth.2"'
Though Garr's Estate did not itself involve the intestate rights of a
polygamous child, the court's solicitous treatment of Garr's illegitimate
progeny augured well for the inheritance rights of polygamous
offspring.
In 1912, the Utah Supreme Court heard Rohwer v. District
Court.26 7 The facts of the case were these: Nephi P. Anderson had
taken Maggie Rohwer as his plural wife. Joseph T. Anderson, the only
child born of the marriage, had been born October 18, 1895. On
March 15, 1898, Maggie Rohwer had conveyed certain real estate to
Joseph T. Anderson, and, one week later, Maggie Rohwer had died.
Joseph T. Anderson subsequently died intestate August 12, 1906.208
The central question in Rohwer was whether Nephi, Joseph's fa-
ther by the plural marriage, could inherit the real estate from the intes-
tate Joseph. In an opinion authored by Justice Joseph E. Frick and
concurred in by Justices McCarty and Straup, the court held that, be-
cause Joseph had been born before January 4, 1896, section 2850 of
the 1896 laws had legitimated him for all purposes.2 9 The statute had
effectively lifted from Joseph all of the common law's disabilities, in-
cluding the inability to transfer property. In addition, the court noted,
Nephi had publicly acknowledged Joseph and had cared for him in his
own family as his son.270 Accordingly, the court held, Nephi was enti-
tled to inherit the real estate from his deceased child.27 1
The next year, in 1913, the Utah Supreme Court heard the last
important reported case involving a polygamous decedent's estate.2 72
266. UTAH REV. STAT. tit. 1, § 10 (1898).
267. 41 Utah 279, 125 P. 671 (1912).
268. Id. at 281-82, 125 P. at 672-73.
269. Id. at 292, 125 P. at 676.
270. Id. at 292, 125 P. at 675-76.
271. Id. at 292-93, 125 P. at 676.
272. Mansfield v. Neff, 43 Utah 259, 134 P. 1160 (1939). The final polygamist decedent's
estate case to appear, Beck v. Idaho-Utah Sugar Co., 59 Utah 314, 203 P. 647 (1921), raised no
new issue of law. Bertha Beck, the plural wife of John Beck, sought to exercise her statutory
dower right over real property that John had owned and conveyed during his marriage to Bertha.
Under Raleigh, of course, Bertha had no such right to exercise. Accordingly, Bertha sought to
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The facts of Mansfield v. Neff are ludicrously complex, and need not
be recounted in full here.2"' Suffice it to say that John Haslam had had
one daughter, who had entered into a polygamous union with one Mat-
thew Mansfield. That union had begotten one child, John Mansfield.
Haslam's daughter had predeceased him, and Haslam had failed to
provide for John Mansfield in his will. John Mansfield sought to have
the will set aside under section 2761 of the Compiled Laws of Utah of
1907, which provided:
When any. testator omits to provide in his will for any of his
children or for the issue of any deceased child, unless it ap-
pears that such omission was intentional, such child or the is-
sue of such child must have the same share in the estate of the
testator as if he had died intestate .... 2 4
Justice Frick, writing an opinion in which Justices McCarty and
Straup concurred, held that the statute applied only to grandchildren
born of lawful marriages.27 5 Justice Frick reasoned that under the com-
mon law, which had been in force in the territory by virtue of the Or-
ganic Act at the time that John Mansfield had been born, John Mans-
field was illegitimate because he was born of a plural marriage.70
Illegitimate children, he held, did not "come within either the letter or
the spirit of said section."2 77 The appellant argued that he had been
made legitimate by the Edmunds Act.2 78 The court ruled, however, that
the Edmunds Act had legitimated illegitimates "only as between them-
selves and their parents. 279 Only by section 2850 of the 1896 code had
polygamous children been legitimated "for all purposes." 28 0 Because
the descent in this case had been cast in 1882, while John Mansfield
was still illegitimate, he had no claim under section 2761.
prove that, after the death of John's lawful wife, he and Bertha had entered into a common-law
marriage in Nevada, whereafter they had held themselves out as man and wife. The Utah Su-
preme Court held the evidence insufficient to sustain Bertha's claim of a common-law marriage,
noting acidly that, when late in life John was reduced from great wealth to ill health and abject
poverty, Bertha lost interest in John, allowing him to be cared for in the home of another of his
wives.
273. See Mansfield, 43 Utah at 264-66, 124 P. at 1161-63.
274. 1907 Utah Comp. Laws § 2761.
275. Mansfield, 43 Utah at 269-71, 134 P. at 1163-64.
276. Id. at 269, 134 P. at 1163.
277. Id.





E. The Utah Justices
The reluctance of the territorial courts to uphold the statutory
rights of polygamous children is no great surprise. The territorial jus-
tices had been appointed to the bench by federal administrations with
antipolygamy agendas, and were presumably selected in light of their
views on plural marriage. The hostility of state court judges is consider-
ably harder to explain. Because state court judges were elected, one
would expect post-1896 judges to have been Mormons, sympathetic to
the plight of polygamous children. Amazingly, quite the opposite was
true. Of the six justices who sat for Handley (in 1897), Raleigh (in
1905), and Mansfield (in 1913), none was a Mormon. Indeed, each of
these six judges was a member of the Republican Party,""1 devoted
since 1856 to the eradication of polygamy, one of the "twin relics of
barbarism."""2
Charles Schuster Zane, who authored Handley, was born and
raised in New Jersey. The son of Quaker parents, he was himself a
lifelong agnostic. Zane did not arrive in Utah until 1884, when, at the
age of fifty-three, he was appointed Chief Justice of the Utah Supreme
Court by President Arthur. Zane was extraordinarily firm in his deal-
ings with polygamy.
At first, his rigorous rulings and severe sentences as a nisi
prius jidge caused the Mormons to call his regime "a judicial
reign of terror." But his enforcement of the laws of a Mormon
legislature with equal rigor, courtesy and impartiality gradu-
ally compelled their respect, the more quickly, no doubt, be-
cause of the fact that his known agnosticism acquitted him of
any charge of religious bias.28 3
When, in 1890, the Church renounced plural marriage, Zane
praised the character of the Mormons, attacked proposed leg-
islation to disfranchise them, helped gain amnesty for those
convicted and to secure the return of Church property for-
feited under the Edmunds-Tucker Law. It was not remarkable
that, when Utah was admitted to the Union, Mormon joined
281. Julien, The Utah State Supreme Court and Its Justices, 1896-1976, 44 UTAH HisT, Q.
267, 279-80 (1976).
282. D. JOHNSON & K. PORTER, NATIONAL PARTY PLATFORMS, 1840-1972, at 27 (5th ed.
1973).
283. 20 DICTIONARY OF AMERICAN BIOGR.APHY 643-44 (1936).
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Gentile to elect him first chief justice of the state.28
James Alvin Miner, who concurred in Handley, was born in Mar-
shall, Michigan, and was a lifelong member of the Episcopalian
Church. Formerly a prosecuting attorney in Michigan, Miner did not
arrive in Utah until 1890, at the age of forty-eight. He was appointed
to the Utah Supreme Court by Benjamin Harrison in 1891. Like Zane,
Miner was elected to the court when Utah became a state in 1896.28
5
George Washington Bartch, who authored Garr and Raleigh, was
likewise not a Mormon. The son of an Evangelical clergyman, Bartch
was born and raised in Pennsylvania. He did not arrive in Utah until
1888, at the age of thirty-nine. President Arthur appointed Bartch to
the Probate Court for Salt Lake County in 1889. Bartch served as pro-
bate judge until 1893, when he was appointed to the Utah Supreme
Court. He was elected to the state supreme court in 1896, where he sat
until 1906. A Presbyterian by faith, he attended the First Church of
Salt Lake City for nearly forty years.288
William Murdock McCarty, who concurred in Garr, Raleigh,
Rohwer and Mansfield, is the only one of these six judges born and
raised in Utah. Born to Mormon parents, McCarty apparently rejected
his inherited faith, attending instead the local Presbyterian church.
McCarty was nevertheless elected to the court in 1902, where he served
until his death in 1919.287
Daniel Newton Straup, who also concurred in Garr, Raleigh, Roh-
wer and Mansfield, was born in South Bend, Indiana. Straup moved to
Salt Lake City in 1890, at the age of twenty-eight. He was elected to
the court in 1905. A Unitarian by faith, Straup regularly attended the
First Unitarian Church of Salt Lake City.
288
Joseph E. Frick, author of Rohwer and Mansfield, was born in
Tiffin, Ohio, and raised in Iowa-both areas where the Mormons had
met with animosity on the road to Salt Lake. Frick arrived in Salt
Lake City in 1897, at the age of forty-nine. He was elected to the court
in 1906, where he sat until 1918. Frick does not appear to have been
affiliated with any particular religious denomination, though his funeral
284. Id.
285. 13 NATIONAL CYCLOPEDIA OF AMERnCAN BroAPHY 477 (1967) [hereinafter NA-
TIoNAL CYCLoPEDIA]; Julien, supra note 281, at 284-85.
286. 20 NATIONAL CYCLOPmA, supra note 285, at 199.
287. 19 NATIONAL CYCLOPEDIA, supra note 285, at 301; Julien, supra note 281, at 284-85.
288. 33 NATIONAL CYCLOP.DIA, supra note 285, at 427-28.
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was conducted by a Congregationalist minister.28 9
Thus, none of the judges deciding cases adverse to polygamous
family inheritance rights was a member of the Mormon Church. In-
deed, only one of these judges was even a native of Utah. Moreover,
Zane, Miner and Bartch, all appointed to the territorial bench by anti-
polygamy administrations, were subsequently elected to the bench by
the people of Utah upon that state's admission to the Union. The politi-
cal success of these gentile judges is indeed a marvel, and might be the
subject of another essay.290 It may be that once the Church and the
legislature had renounced polygamy, the threat posed by a gentile
judge was greatly diminished in Mormon eyes.
The scant biographical information available on these state court
judges nevertheless goes far in explaining the results reached in these
post-1896 decisions. Handley, decided entirely by former territorial
judges and based on sound constitutional principles, is no great sur-
prise.2 91 Nor does Raleigh pose substantial explanatory problems.
2 2
While the 1896 legislature had shown great generosity toward polyga-
mous children, it had granted no statutory relief for plural wives. In-
deed, the 1896 legislature had by statute established the common-law
right of dower in Utah. Justice Bartch, a former territorial judge,
would have had little difficulty distinguishing his decision in Raleigh
from his opinion in Garr. Garr involved an illegitimate child born of
the union of two unmarried people and acknowledged by his father.293
The legislature had clearly provided inheritance rights for such a child
under section 2833. Raleigh, on the other hand, involved the claim of
an adult woman who had knowingly entered into a polygamous union
in violation of the laws of the United States. For such a woman the
legislature had provided no relief. The Republican, Presbyterian son of
an Evangelical minister was not to second-guess the wisdom of the leg-
islature on that point.
Rohwer and Mansfield, both decided by panels of Frick, McCarty
and Straup, appear flatly inconsistent in their policies toward polyga-
mous children. The Rohwer court was certainly correct in its reading of
section 2850.294 However, there is nothing in the language or legislative
289. 22 NATIONAL CYCLOPEDIA, supra note 285, at 250; Julien, supra note 281, at 284-85.
290. For a tentative, not altogether convincing hypothesis, see Julien, supra note 281, at 276.
291. See supra notes 252-57 and accompanying text.
292. See supra notes 258-60 and accompanying text.
293. See supra notes 263-65 and accompanying text.
294. See supra notes 267-71 and accompanying text.
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history of the Edmunds Act to support Mansfield's contention that sec-
tion 7 legitimated polygamous children only as between themselves and
their parents. 9 5 If the Mansfield court felt free to play fast and loose
with legislative intent, why did not the same panel feel so free in Roh-
wer? The answer, it appears, may lie less in any notion of a hidden
political agenda than in the vicissitudes of judicial gastronomy.
VII. CONCLUSION
The practice of plural marriage in nineteenth-century Utah cre-
ated exotic family structures with which the traditional law of intestacy
was not prepared to deal. In order to protect the interests of plural
wives and their children, the Utah legislative assembly enacted a series
of statutes designed to accommodate the peculiar inheritance needs of
a polygamous society. In the battle against polygamy, the federal gov-
ernment was initially sympathetic to the plight of polygamous children,
if not to that of their mothers. In 1887's fit of exasperation, however,
Congress took no prisoners.
By 1890, the development of the West and the draconian anti-
polygamy campaign of the federal government had wreaked havoc on
the previously unbreachable Mormon solidarity. The Church renounced
plural marriage, and the ecclesiastical system waned in importance. Po-
lygamist decedents' estates cases began to appear in the Utah Reports.
As the Handley saga eloquently testifies, the Utah territorial and state
courts were almost uniformly hostile. As late as 1913, the Utah courts
were finding creative, if implausible, ways to disinherit polygamous
children.
The paucity of reported cases on polygamous decedents' estates
suggests that the novel inheritance statutes of nineteenth century Utah
played mostly a secondary, contextual role in structuring the transmis-
sion of wealth upon death. Many polygamists provided for their fami-
lies through wills or lifetime transfers, 9 8 while the families of intestate
polygamists often arrived at informal, consensual divisions of the es-
tate.297 The ecclesiastical courts held powerful sway until the 1890s,
and even thereafter the pressure to share the wealth with polygamous
wives and their children remained considerable.2 08 In characteristic
295. See supra notes 273-80 and accompanying text.
296. K. YOUNG, supra note 1, at 264-65.
297. Id. at 267-70.
298. Id. at 271-72.
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fashion, the Mormons had managed to take care of their own without
the aid of the ungodly.
